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The available evidence at this time regarding real world vaccine effectiveness and duration ofprotection shows that all vaccines authorised in the EU/EEA are currently highly protectiveagainst hospitalisation, severe disease and death for a variety of strains of COVID-192. This doesnot mean that individuals are immune from SARS-CoV-2 infection once vaccinated. People whoare vaccinated may still be able to transmit SARS-CoV-2 infection to susceptible contacts3.TransmissionThe virus that causes COVID-19 is spread through exposure to very small respiratory liquidparticles released in the exhaled breath of an infectious individual. Current evidence indicatesthat respiratory liquid particles travel through the air over variable distances and can causeinfection if they are inhaled. This risk increases if individuals are in close proximity and/or over aprolonged period of time. These respiratory particles can travel over longer distances i.e. morethan 2 metres and the evidence would suggest that this is most likely to happen in crowdedindoor environments with prolonged exposure and when the ventilation in a room is poor.4Certain procedures, known as Aerosol Generating Procedures (AGP), can create the potential forairborne transmission. Further information on ventilation, AGPs and COVID-19 is available on theHPSC website.Individuals are considered most infectious around one day before symptom onset with anaverage period of infectiousness and risk of transmission between 2-3 days before and 8 daysafter symptom onset.5 The exact duration of when COVID-19 patients are infectious is unknownand is likely to vary between variants as well as between patients. It is dependent on manyfactors, but in particular, the individual’s immune status, disease severity and the viral load towhich they have been exposed, as well as the type of contact. individuals-previous-infection4Morawska L. Droplet fate in indoor environments, or can we prevent the spread of infection? Indoor Air. 2019-ncov/faq.html#Basics6 ion-of-people-with-COVID-19-thirdupdate.pdf7Lee S, Kim T, Lee E, Lee C, Kim H, Rhee H, et al. Clinical Course and Molecular Viral Shedding Among Asymptomatic and Symptomatic PatientsWith SARS-CoV-2 Infection in a Community Treatment Center in the Republic of Korea. JAMA Internal Medicine. 2020;180(11):1447-52.Available at: E Health Protection Surveillance Centre. www.hpsc.iePage 10 of 48

Current evidence indicates that asymptomatic persons represent a source of transmissible SARSCoV-2.7Peak levels of viral loads are detected around the time of symptom onset. 8 In general,virus remains detectable in respiratory secretions for up to eight days in moderate cases andlonger in severe cases of COVID-19.Incubation periodCurrent estimates suggest that the time between exposure to the virus and developingsymptoms (incubation period) is from five to six days on average but can range from 2 to 14days. 9Survival in the environmentThe SARS-CoV-2 virus has an outer coating called a lipid envelope. The presence of the lipidenvelope means that virus is likely to survive for shorter periods outside the human bodycompared to a non-enveloped virus like Norovirus (Winter vomiting virus). The virus is easilykilled by common household cleaning products including bleach and disinfectants. Survival onenvironmental surfaces depends on the type of surface and the environmental conditions. Onestudy using a SARS-CoV-2 strain showed that it can survive for up to 72 hours on plastic, for 48hours on stainless steel and for up to eight hours on copper when no cleaning is performed. 10However, the levels of virus declined very quickly over the time period.Clinical features of COVID-19 11Most people with COVID-19 will have mild disease and will recover. A minority will develop moreserious illness. The National Immunisation Advisory Committee (NIAC) have defined a list /Evidence-Summary COVID-19 on10 van Doremalen, N. et al. Aerosol and surface stability of SARS-CoV-2 as compared with SARS-CoV-1. N. Engl. J. Med.https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMc2004973 (2020).11 da Rosa Mesquita R, Francelino Silva Junior LC, Santos Santana FM, et al. Clinical manifestations of COVID-19 in the general population:systematic review. Wien Klin Wochenschr. 2021;133(7-8):377-382. doi:10.1007/s00508-020-01760-49HSE Health Protection Surveillance Centre. www.hpsc.iePage 11 of 48

underlying conditions associated with very high risk or high risk of severe COVID-19 disease. Pleasesee here for further information.Very high risk and high-risk groups should, where possible: get a COVID-19 vaccine get a booster dose wear a medical or respirator face mask in indoor or outdoor crowded places follow advice on how to protect yourself from COVID-19Further considerations for those at risk of severe disease of COVID-19 infection can be found here.The interim case definition is on the HPSC website. The most common signs and symptoms ofCOVID-19 are available on the HSE website.Laboratory testing Laboratory testing for SARS-CoV-2 is performed in the same way as testing forinfluenza. A viral swab is collected from the throat and nasopharynx. Only one swabis used to collect both samples, with the throat site sampled first. When testing is performed, ensure the correct swab type is taken (viral swab) and it isappropriately labelled. There must be two patient identifiers on both the swab andrequest form such as Name and date of birth (DOB). Details on the swab and request formmust match each other. Ensure that an outbreak code, contact name and telephonenumber (mobile preferably) for the person requesting the test (typically a clinician) areclearly visible on the request form. Deliver the sample to the testing laboratory as soonas possible. No diagnostic test is 100% sensitive and specific. If a test result comes back as “SARSCoV-2 not detected”, this is not definitive confirmation that the person is notinfected with the virus. If the person in question remains unwell with no alternativediagnosis then a diagnosis of COVID-19 is still possible.HSE Health Protection Surveillance Centre. www.hpsc.iePage 12 of 48

Rapid Antigen Detection Tests (RADTs)Rapid Antigen Detection Tests (RADTs) are now used widely within the community totest for the presence of COVID-19 infection. Please see here for further information.VaccinationEffective vaccines against COVID-19 are available. This is an additional and importantintervention to prevent the spread of the virus.COVID-19: Management of the outbreakPlanning Each Department of Public Health should identify a lead for COVID-19 preparedness andresponse coordination. The lead should be a person with sufficient authority to ensurethat appropriate action is taken and may require the support of a team including a liaisonperson for the outbreak setting. Acute and community settings must have COVID-19 preparedness plans in place toinclude planning for isolating confirmed or suspected cases (including temporaryconversion of day rooms etc to facilitate such), cohorting of cases (keeping people withCOVID-19 separate from those without COVID-19), enhanced infection prevention andcontrol (IPC) measures, staff training, establishing surge capacity and promoting case andfamily communication. Where possible, each ward or floor should try and operate as a discrete unit or zone,meaning that staff and equipment are dedicated to a specific area and are not rotatedfrom other areas (this includes night duty). This practice will help to reduce risk oftransmission in the event that COVID-19 is introduced into the facility and will allowoutbreak response measures to be targeted in zones, further mitigating risks. This maynot always be feasible in smaller facilities, but consideration should be given as to howclosely the facility can align to these recommendations. Facilities should ensure the availability of supplies including tissues, alcohol based handrub (ABHR), hand wipes, cleaning products (including disinfectants) and personalHSE Health Protection Surveillance Centre. www.hpsc.iePage 13 of 48

protective equipment (PPE) and liaise with local CHO management if there is difficulty inobtaining such supplies. A set of standards for managing outbreaks is outlined in Appendix D. A checklist of key interventions for the prevention and management of a COVID-19outbreak can be found in Appendix E.For more setting specific guidance on preparedness and response to COVID-19 outbreaks pleasesee the following supplemental documents: Interim guidance for the management of COVID-19 in Residential Care Facilities Supplemental guidance for the management of outbreaks in the acute hospital setting Note: Infection prevention and control precautions guidance should be followed duringthe preparedness and response phases of all outbreaks.Outbreak investigation objectives and functionsThe primary aims of outbreak investigation are to: Control the outbreak, Mitigate the effects of the outbreak, and Stop the outbreak by preventing further cases of COVID-19.The primary objectives of outbreak investigation are to: Determine/confirm that it is a COVID-19 outbreak, Identify the pathway(s) of transmission, Prevent generation of further cases, Plan and implement priority interventions/control measures to mitigate the effect ofthe outbreak, Bring the outbreak to an endThe key functions in managing outbreaks include the following: Identification and initial response; Investigation; Risk assessment;HSE Health Protection Surveillance Centre. www.hpsc.iePage 14 of 48

Surveillance, notification and reporting; Risk management; Risk communication; Audit, evaluation and documentation.Identification and initial responseOn recognition of an outbreak the following steps are important: all relevant agencies with a responsibility for the investigation and management of theincident are informed; steps are taken to gather further information about the cases and how they may havebeen exposed; an initial risk assessment is undertaken; urgent control measures are put in place to protect public health.Informed by an initial risk assessment and in consultation with relevant stakeholders, the MOHshould decide whether an investigation and specific control measures are required. These shouldbe implemented as soon as possible.InvestigationFrom the information gathered from the initial investigation, it may be possible to form a workinghypothesis about the route of exposure, level of exposure, nature and size of the populationexposed or likely to be exposed, and the degree of risk to public health. The MOH will then decidehow to progress a more comprehensive investigation.The investigation should typically consist of three elements: an epidemiological investigation; an investigation into the nature and characteristics of the outbreak; a specific investigation into how cases were exposed (e.g. hygiene in healthcare settings,no PPE) to inform control measures.Risk assessmentHSE Health Protection Surveillance Centre. www.hpsc.iePage 15 of 48

Based on information obtained and/or received from key stakeholders, the findings from theinvestigation and an assessment of the effectiveness of control measures taken, the MOH / OCTshould assess the ongoing risk to the public and to patients if the outbreak is in a hospital orsimilar community facility. The purpose of this assessment is two-fold, to assess: (i) whetherexposure is ongoing, and (ii) the impact of exposure (numbers affected and severity).Risk assessment essentially entails appraising the evidence collected in the incident investigationand determining whether it indicates that there is an ongoing significant threat to public health.The risk assessment should be dynamic and regularly reviewed by the MOH and should includethe following considerations:Severity: Dynamically assessed degree of foreseeable harm that may be caused to individuals orto the population and possible issues with recovery in the aftermath of the outbreak.Confidence: Knowledge, derived from all sources of information, that confirms the existence andnature of the threat and the routes by which it can affect the population.Spread: The size of the actual and potentially affected population.Interventions: The availability and feasibility of population interventions to alter the course andinfluence the outcome of the event.Context: The broad environment, including media interest, public concern and attitudes,expectations, pressures, strength of professional knowledge and external factors includingpolitical decisions. (STEEP criteria – social, technological, economic, environmental, political).Conclusions derived from the risk assessment are principally a matter of professional judgement.However, for reasons of public accountability and understanding, it is essential that this processis as transparent as possible. The MOH or the Health Officer on behalf of the MOH and/or OCTshould discuss and record in writing the outcome of the risk assessments. Once the risk has beenassessed, a decision should be made on how the risk is likely to be perceived by the public. Thisshould inform the development of specific public communications about the risk and how it isbeing mitigated.HSE Health Protection Surveillance Centre. www.hpsc.iePage 16 of 48

Outbreak Control TeamThe below is generic guidance for Outbreak Control Teams where they are convened. For specificguidance for Residential Care Facilities, please see here. All outbreaks of COVID-19 must be reported to the regional Medical Officer of Health(MOH) at the Department of Public Health at the earliest opportunity. The MOH from the Regional Department of Public Health has the responsibility toinvestigate, risk assess and manage an outbreak of COVID-19 as they deem appropriate. Following a risk assessment, the MOH will decide if an OCT if appropriate or not. An OCT can assist the MOH in discharging this responsibility. Ideally, the OCT should haveregular, active involvement of a Public Health Doctor. However, if that is not practicallypossible, following initial consultation and advice from Public Health the OCT should liaiseon a regular basis with the regional Department of Public Health to provide updates onoutbreak progress and seek further advice as appropriate. The OCT configuration should be decided at local level and will depend on availableexpertise. An OC

organisational aspects of the COVID-19 outbreak response, and outlines communication, investigation and control procedures. NB: The protection of public health takes priority over all other considerations, and this must be understood by all members of the Outbreak Control Team (OCT). Appendix A outlines an example of membership of the OCT.