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POWER AND INFLUENCE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLDINTRODUCTIONPolicymakers, pundits, and scholars (with the exception, perhaps, of a few hard-core realists),widely acknowledge that power and influenceare derived from more than just coercive military capabilities, but are exercised through networks of economic, political, and security interactions involvingstates as well as non-state actors. Influential states areable to effectively deploy a broader portfolio of instruments-of-influence to modify the beliefs and/or the behavior of other states. It is this ability that lies at theheart of effective statecraft—one that protects and promotes national interests—in today’s globalized world.Despite the growing importance of relational power, thebudgets of State Departments and Foreign Services ofcountries on both sides of the Atlantic have receivedsubstantial cuts these past few years. The TrumpAdministration’s budget for Fiscal Year 2018 includesplans to decrease the State Department’s budget by30 percent. Departments of key European countriessuch as France and the United Kingdom have alsobeen severely downsized in the aftermath of the GreatRecession.5 These cuts are not only about the needto ‘balance-the-budget,’ but take place in the contextof the wave of populist pro-sovereignty that hasswept the political landscape of Western democraciesin recent years. The concomitant societal backlashagainst globalization is further fueling political supportto ‘take back national control’ and withdraw frominternational participation, as was clearly captured byBrexit and Trump’s America First doctrine. Whether therise of this movement was caused by the ‘liberal order’being ‘rigged,’6 or resulted from the failure of politicalleaders to properly explain the benefits of internationalparticipation to their constituencies, is a question wewill not concern ourselves with here.756784Conspicuously absent in popular and scholarly debatesis an understanding of what international influenceis. Beyond anecdotal evidence or broad brusheddescriptions of the utility of ‘soft,’ ‘smart,’ or ‘civilian’power, there is simply neither a clear concept nor asystematic measurement of international influencederived from relational dependence.8 This lack of clearconceptualization drives a gap in measurement.In this report, we seek to fill some of this conceptualand empirical gap. We present a set of highlights fromthe results of an in-depth analysis of a newly createddataset called the Foreign Bilateral Influence Capacity(FBIC) Index that measures the bilateral influence ofstates. The FBIC Index includes forty-two economic,political, and security indicators with over 200 millionindividual observations from 1963 to the present. Themultidimensional, dyadic measurement of influencemakes it possible to conduct a broader analysisof different aspects of international relations thantraditional power, resource-based approaches.Using the FBIC Index, we identify the key influencersin the international system and analyze the states thatpunch above their weight and those that punch below.We trace the rise of China, the long trajectory of declineof some European states, as well as the surprisinglystrong performance of others, and we reflect on thevery different positions of the United States andRussia in all of this. We expose regional spheres ofinfluence and pay attention to the contested zonesin the international system and the pivot states thatreside there. Finally, we look at networks of influencein the international system and discuss their evolutionover time.For Trump’s Proposal, see “A New Foundation for American Greatness: Fiscal Year 2018,” Office of Management and Budget, les/omb/budget/fy2018/budget.pdf; see also “The Key Spending Cuts and Increasesin Trump’s Budget,” New York Times, May 22, 2017, mp-budget-winners-losers.html?mcubz 3& r 0; for Great Britain, see John McDermott, “UK Foreign Office ministers warn over cuts,” Financial Times, November2, 2015, -ed1a37d1e096; for France, see Tony Cross, “France to face extra budgetcuts to meet EU deficit target,” RFI, July 11, 2017, a-budget-cuts-meet-eu-deficittarget. Germany, on the other hand, increased its spending; see Nils Zimmermann, “German federal budget goes up for 2017,” DeutscheWelle, November 25, 2016, -for-2017/a-36528845.Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Liberal Order Is Rigged,” Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2017, -04-17/liberal-order-rigged.For an excellent overview of various explanations, see Ronald Inglehart and Norris, Pippa, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism:Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash,” HKS Working Paper No. RWP16-026, July 29, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659.See for example Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs, July 1, 2009, /get-smart; Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Leading Through Civilian Power,” Foreign Affairs, November1, 2010, NTIC COUNCIL

POWER AND INFLUENCE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLDWith this report, we aspire to do more than just infuseforeign policy debates about the United States’ andEurope’s standing in the world with much neededconceptual and empirical clarity. We seek to bridgethat gap between quantitative policy analysis and realworld policymaking, and we outline, if only preliminarily,what we consider quintessential elements of a grandstrategy aimed at enlarging influence to protect andpromote critical national security interests.ATLANTIC COUNCILThis report is structured as follows: it first defines theconcept of influence in the FBIC Index with referenceto the literature on power and influence and explainsthe methodological fundamentals of the Index’sconstruction. (The thirty-page annex to this reportoffers more detail.) It then turns to the empiricalanalysis along the lines just described, and it concludeswith an assessment of the implications of our findings.5

POWER AND INFLUENCE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLDCONCEPTUALIZING INFLUENCEThe concepts of influence and power both featureprominently in international relations literature,9but extant scholarship often fails to coherentlydistinguish them from one another.10 We conceptualizeinfluence as a broader concept than power in international relations. The following section outlines ourconceptual framing for the concept of influence in theinternational system.In introducing our concept of influence, it is useful todistinguish and briefly discuss three schools of thought.The first views influence and power as synonymous andposits that the two concepts are indistinguishable.11This perspective, originally spearheaded by Max Weber,views power and influence alike as objects exercisedover “other persons”12—these are “the ability of anindividual or group to achieve their own goals or aimswhen others are trying to prevent them from realizingthem.”13 Prominent power theorists such as Robert A.Dahl, Steven Lukes, and David A. Baldwin have takenup this view, arguing that the concepts of influence andpower simply refer to actor A’s capacity to get actor Bto “do something that B would not otherwise do,”14 andthat the concepts of influence and power can be A second school of thought aligns with the first inits conceptualization of influence as a change whichactor A brings about in actor B. However it differs inits view that power—far from being synonymous withinfluence—is a concept that denotes actor A’s abilityto influence actor B.16 In this view, power is somethingwhich can be possessed while influence is somethingthat can be exerted. Realist authors such as HansMorgenthau and Kenneth N. Waltz hold this view andposit that a nation’s material capabilities play a keyrole in the state’s ability to modify the behavior ofits peers.17Finally, a third school of thought, which is adhered toby the FBIC Index, conceptualizes influence as a forcethat transforms into power when actor A actively(and successfully) utilizes it to modify the behavior ofactor B. It posits that the relationship between powerand influence is best captured as a hierarchy in whichinfluence is the general concept, and power is theconscious manifestation of influence.18 It subscribesto the notion that an actor can possess influenceby presiding over sources (whether natural, military,or relational), but contends that it does not holdpower unless it has the capacity to successfully fieldits sources of influence towards achieving desiredoutcomes.19 This sentiment is clearly expressed bySearching JSTOR according to the ‘power’ and ‘influence’ parameters yields 160,980 and 165,418 results respectively.See Ruth Zimmerling, Influence and Power: Variations on a Messy Theme (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 104–47; see also Ingmar Pörn,The Logic of Power (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), 68; Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework forPolitical Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University, 1950), 71; Serge Moscovici, “Sozialer Wandel Durch Minoritäten,” in Social Influence andSocial Change, trans. A. Hechler (London: Academic Press, 1979), 77; and Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed. (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1975), 99.See Allen Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), 489; see also Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Future ofPower (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 12.Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1947), 152.Weber, Theory, 152.See Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), 202–3; see also Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 36. Note that Lukes takes a mixed view on influence and power, and occasionally divorces the termsfrom one another entirely.David A. Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,” International Organization 34, no. 4 (1980): 502.See Dorwin Cartwright, “Influence, Leadership, Control,” in Handbook of Organizations, ed. James G. March (New York: Routledge,1965), 125; see also C. W. Cassinelli, Free Activities and Interpersonal Relations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 47–48; John R.P. French and Bertran Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” in Studies in Social Power, ed. Dorwin Cartwright (Michigan: University ofMichigan Press, 1960), 609; John R. P. French, “A Formal Theory of Social Power,” Psychological Review 63 (1956): 728; Robert W. Coxand Harold Karan Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization (New York: Yale University Press,1973), 3; and Lukes, Power, 205.See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (London: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 102–11; Hans Morgenthau, Politics amongNations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 15.See Zimmerling, Influence and Power, 104.; see also Dennis H. Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988),21; and Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society, 76–77, 84.Zimmerling, Influence and Power, 146.ATLANTIC COUNCIL

POWER AND INFLUENCE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLDDennis H. Wrong, who states that if actor A succeedsin altering actor B’s behavior “in the desired direction,then he clearly has power over B.”20The exercise of influence results from an unspokenunderstanding (or promise) that state A can cut offstate B if it fails to comply. Implicit influence mayalso manifest itself through co-optive means. In thesecases, it derives from state attractiveness. Stateattractiveness is understood as a source of co-optiveinfluence which compels third parties to go along withone another’s purposes “without any explicit threat orexchange taking place.” Because state B’s perceptionof state A’s “attractiveness” is dependent on a host ofstate-specific variables (e.g., its history with state A,culture of state B, etc.), it can be argued that ideationalpower—like its resource-based counterpart—alsoremains subject to relational context.Because of the array of potential types of influenceand its context specificity, the concept of influence isbest expressed in terms of state A’s potential capacityto influence state B rather than through the analysisof actual outcomes. This is because state influence—though it may be exerted intentionally—can also lead tochange that is “neither actively pursued nor beneficialto” the influencer,21 and partially because influence doesnot produce outputs which can be easily measured (orattributed) to actors at the dyadic level.The FBIC Index facilitates a multidimensionalunderstanding of influence in which both access tonational resources and relational context are treated.22This approach differs from other methods that rely on aresource-based model for measuring capacity to bringabout change in other actors.23 The multidimensionalapproach posits that state influence derives partiallyfrom discrepancies in access to national resources24and partially from relationally contextual factors,which, when combined, denote how effectively eitherside can leverage the national resources at its disposalto influence the other.25In the context of interstate relations, we submitthat influence derives from a combination of stateaccess to national resources, and from relational,context-specific dynamics between countries A andB, including state attractiveness. National resourcesinclude economic, political, and security means. Withina dyad, asymmetrical access to these resources causesimbalances in dependency. Such imbalances allow stateA to exert influence over state B both explicitly andimplicitly. In cases where imbalances lead to influencebeing exerted explicitly, state A’s relative independenceallows it to coerce state B because state A can crediblythreaten to withhold from state B resources on whichit depends. The implicit exercise of influence derivesfrom the same dynamic, but results from an unspokenunderstanding (or promise) that state A can cut offstate B if it fails to comply with unspoken wishes.20 Wrong, Power, 13.21 Wrong, 4, 23.22 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, 2nd ed. (London: SAGE Publications,2011), 275.23 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), Chapter 8; Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics, 102–11; Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 15.24 See Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” 275.25 See Zimmerling, Influence and Power, 123; see also Nye, The Future of Power, 13; Harold Dwight Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Powerand Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (Yale University Press, 1965), 83; Andrew Heywood, Key Concepts in Politics (New York:Macmillan, 2000), 35; G Kuypers, Grondbegrippen van politiek (Utrecht; Antwerpen: Het Spectrum, 1973), 84, 87; Dahl, The Concept ofPower, 202-3; and Matteo Pallaver, “Power and Its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart,” (thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science,2011), 12, http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/220/1/Pallaver Power and Its Forms.pdf.ATLANTIC COUNCIL7

POWER AND INFLUENCE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLDMEASURING INFLUENCE:THE FBIC INDEXThe Foreign Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC)Index is built upon the idea that two main factors affect the ability of states to exert influencein the international system. First, the extent of interaction across economic, political, and security dimensions creates opportunities for states to influence eachother. Second, the relative dependence of one state onanother for crucial aspects of economic prosperity orsecurity creates opportunities for the more dominantstate to cause the more dependent state to make decisions that they would not have otherwise made. We callthese two sub-indices Bandwidth and Dependence.26indicators to measure the reliance one country in thedyad has on the other.The contrast between Bandwidth and Dependence isexpanded upon in Table 3.Table 2: Data sources used in the FBIC IndexDescriptionBandwidthThe size of the relationship (“pipelinevolume”) between countries A andB based on economic, military, andpolitical indicators.DependenceThe relational context that governswhich side of the dyad can leverageobserved bandwidth to its advantagemore credibly.BANDWIDTH AND DEPENDENCEThe Bandwidth sub-index measures the extent of theconnection between two countries reflected in thevolume of shared economic, political, and securityinteractions. All components of the Bandwidth subindex are shared, absolute measures that represent thesize and number of connection points between twostates. One way of thinking about this is as the “sizeof the pipeline” of potential influence through whicha country can then direct actual influence towardsanother country. As the size of cross-border flowsincreases, so does the size of the pipeline that bothstates can use to potentially direct influence. The valueof the Bandwidth sub-index is symmetrical, so in eachyear the value from country A to country B will alwaysequal country B to country A. For example, total tradebetween countries A and B is one of our bandwidthindicators. For this sub-indicator the value for a givendyad in a given year will be the same whether a givenstate is considered country A or country B (this isnot true for the next sub-indicator). See Table 2 for adescription of the data sources used in the FBIC Index.The Dependence sub-index measures the “strength ofthe flow in each direction” or the degree to which an‘influencee’ relies on an influencer for crucial economicand security assets. We have not included any politicalindicators in the Dependence sub-index because ourdata does not include asymmetric political connections.The Dependence sub-index operationalizes relativeThis sub-index has two components: 1) the importanceof a flow relative to that total inflow for a country and2) the importance of a flow relative to the aggregateeconomic or military capacity of the country. Let usexplain that by going back to the trade example. Thefirst component of the Dependence sub-index is theshare of the overall trade volume of country B thatoccurs with country A. This is an important element ofinfluence: if most of country A’s external trade is withcountry B, it is quite dependent on it in as far as itstrade is concerned. But that indicator alone does nottell the full story. If trade represents only a very smallpart of country A’s GDP, then even a very high relativetrade dependence (in percent of trade terms) wouldyield less influence capacity than if its economy werehighly integrated in the global trading network.This is why measures of economy and military size areincluded in our dependence scores. For the economiccomponents of our Dependence measure, we utilizegross domestic product; for the security componentswe use military spending. The sub-index Dependenceis directed, or asymmetric, so the value of country Ato country B is different than the value from country Bto country A.26 For more information on the methodology used to construct the FBIC, please see pardee.du.edu/working-papers.8ATLANTIC COUNCIL

POWER AND INFLUENCE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLDTable 3: FBIC Index taxonomy and l tradeTotal arms transfersLevel of representationTrade agreementsMilitary alliancesIntergovernmental membershipTrade, % of total tradeArms imports, % of total armsimportsTrade, % of GDPArms imports, % of militaryspendingBandwidthDependenceAid, % of total aidAid, % of GDPThe FBIC Index is calculated by taking the productof the Bandwidth and Dependence sub-indices;a combination of the magnitude of shared ties and thedegree of dependency among the dyad.Each subcomponent in the FBIC Index is weighte

POWER AND INFLUENCE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL T oday the ability to get other states to act in the international system may be characterized more by formal networks of influence than by tradi-tional measures of coercive material capabilities. Yet, the concept o