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The Case for Direct Cash Transfers to the PoorAuthor(s): Devesh Kapur, Partha Mukhopadhyay and Arvind SubramanianSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 15 (Apr. 12 - 18, 2008), pp. 37-41, 43Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40277336Accessed: 30-11-2015 17:26 UTCYour use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at s.jspJSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of contentin a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Economic and PoliticalWeekly.http://www.jstor.orgThis content downloaded from 160.39.7.19 on Mon, 30 Nov 2015 17:26:27 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Case forDirectCashTransfersto thePoorDEVESH KAPUR, PARTHAMUKHOPADHYAY,ARVIND on be sufficientto transferRs 1 croreannuallyto each panchayat- morethanan order of magnitudeof what theyreceivetoday.Mightthatbe a betterwaytoachievethesegoals?ofExistingSchemeson centralThetotalexpenditureare fewcountrieswherethe Deficienciesstateand thepolicyand intellectual While there is little rigorousanalysisschemesforthepoorand on thehavebeenas committed abouttheeffectivenessofess and princicommunitymajorsubsidiesexceedsthestates' to povertyeradicationas India - bothinpal subsidies,thereis plentyof indirectshareofcentraltaxes.Thesetermsof rhetoricand througha rangeof evidencethatpointsin the directionofsubsidiesand an arrayoftargetedpoverty waste and ineffectiveness.schemesare con2006-07,programmes.reportsanalysisdue to a cultureofperformerswereat least151centralsector(including trovertiblefact:mostof the resourcesininpublicadministrationimmunityschemes- hereafter these programmesfail to reach theircentrally-sponsored)andweakenedlocal governments. collectivleyreferredto as ess - entailing intendedbeneficiaries.Notonlyis thisathatthepoorshouldbeannual expendituresof about Rs 72,000 realityknown to policy analysts,nonArguingcrore.OfaboutRsthis,64,000 crore,i e, governmentorganisations and intertrustedtouse theseresourcesalmost90 per cent,wereallocatedto 30 national donors who supportthe probetterthanthestate,a radicalschemes.1In the 2008-09 budget,these grammes,state functionarieswho aredirect 30 schemes(now reducedto 27 due to nitortheseto individualsandtransfersconsolidation) have been allocated programmesare equallywell informed.own assessments,condecentralisation nearlyRs 79,000 crore,i e, an increaseof The government'scomplementaryand23 per cent over two years. This is ductedvariouslyby theComptrolleris proposed.tolocalgovernmentseven withoutincludingother ess that AuditorGeneral(cag), PlanningCommisrisksand associated masquerade as additionalcentralplan sion and otheragencies,show that theThebenefits,and assistance, such as the Jawaharlal ess have been process-driven,reinforcementwithlittleoi omes.emphasis measuringare outlined.accountabilityIn 2001, a workinggroupof the ingCommissionhad stated;"AccountaA similaramountis budgetedforfood, bilityin the monitoringprocessis veryfertiliserand fuelsubsidies.An amountof weak. The fear of adverseremarkshasRs 32,666 crorehas been allocatedtothe preventedofficialsfromreportingpoorFood CorporationofIndia(fci) forprocur- performances.Concealment of shortandingdistributingfoodgrainsthrough comingsand manipulationof data havethe publicdistributionsystem(pds), and been resortedto, to coverpoor performRs 30,986 crore for fertilisersubsidies ances.Due to concealmentofweaknessesbonds that in programmes,appropriatecorrective(not includingany fertiliserwill have %obe issued).3If we add to actionsare not taken.Monitoringunitsthis the budgetedpds expenditureon tend to shift responsibilitiesfor poorkeroseneand lpg of Rs 2,700 croreand performancesto line departments.Rs 21,554crore of oil bonds that were Monitoringunits and the departmentsissued until December 2007, the furnishingdata and reportsare notheldtotal amountof thesesubsidiesis nearly accountable for false picturescreatedRs 88,000 crore.by them."4Indeed, the primeministerandthehimselfin a fortheAdvancedStudyofoil bondsforthelast quarterof2007-08, spendfartoo muchmoneyfundingsubsiofPennsylvania,US; ParthaIndia,Universitytotal expenditureson ess and subsidies dies in the name of equity,withneitheris atMukhopadhyay(partha@cprindia.org)exceed the Rs 1,78,765 equityobjectivesnorefficiencywill wDelhi;thatisthestates*shareofcentraltax enue.Is this enormousexpenditure To itscredit,the2008 budgetacknowis msthebest ledgesthisrealityby decidingto "putinand withJohnsCentreforGlobalDevelopmentthe welfareof India's place CentralPlan SchemesMonitoringway of improvingUS.HopkinsUniversity,andachievingIndia's development System(cpsms)"to trackand reportonpoor& Politicalweekly DDES april 12, 2008EconomicThis content downloaded from 160.39.7.19 on Mon, 30 Nov 2015 17:26:27 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions37
the exceptionshouldleads to continuousat- a hard taskmaster,out- Centralcase, itappearsthatetc,provetemptsputs,Centrallytherule because getdocumenthas never inpartthecumulationof,andresponseto, appearanceof moralposturingis l expenditureat the level previousfailures.We howeverbelieve superiorof a scheme,whichis available onlyfor that the principal reasons are more suchas se are prinsome ess throughvarious audit docu- banal and fundamental.Nonetheless,mentsand parliamentarystandingcom- cipallytwo, viz: (a) a deeplyingrained Given the dismal living conditionsofinpublicadministra- India'spoor,itcouldbe arguedthatsomemittee reports.As noted in Virmani se tion that is yokedto (b) a local public thingis betterthan nothing,and surely,matterswould have been worsewithoutwithweakcapabilities.of fundsby the centralgovernmentand administrationButthatis forphysicalinputsegregiousdere- theseprogrammes.of have,manyconsequencesby implementationagency, rypartsnear impossible.Take the muchbutreceivedlittle.How can thisbecenturyof such schemes startingfrom accountabilityin case of primaryeducation and public d-1950s.health,areas wherethe "technology"It is importantto emphasisethatmost whatto do and how to do it is relatively DesignofDirectTransfersofoftheseess havehad goodintentionsand well known. Chaudhuryet al (2006) Let us startwiththesimplearithmeticmuchthoughthas goneintotheirdesign. provideevidencethaton anygivenday,a resources. Accordingto the Economicineachcase onlya smallfraction substantialnumberof public teachers Survey2007-08, about 27.5 per cent ofHowever,ofoverallresourcesreachesthepoordueto, and health workersdo not show up India'sroughly1.13billionpeoplearebelowin hisis(bpl), i e, about310 milpovertyinefficiencydespiteto reachthepoor),leakages (to Indian public schoolteachersare paid lion people or 70 oregone considerablymore than their private the Rs 1,80,000 crorespenton*ess andparticipationand fuelsubsidiesweredisearningsthatare especiallyconsequential counterparts.One consequenceof this food,fertiliserin employmentis thatdespitetheincreasein tributedequally to all these 70 millionprogrammes)and large absenteeismadministrativecosts. Guhan (1994) esti- enrolmentsafterSarva Siksha Abhiyan households,it would mean a monthlyof over Rs 2,140per household.matedthatfora budgetaryexpenditure (ssa), the learningoutcomesstill leave transferlineincomeof Rs 100, the finaltransferto the poor muchtobe desired.Thisis morethanthepovertywas justRs 21.6throughtheMaharashtraTo add tothis,all povertyinterventions forruralhouseholdsand more than 70GuaranteeScheme, where havetopass throughtheeyeoftheneedle, per cent of the urban povertyline inEmploymentthe poor self-selectedthemselvesby viz, a local publicadministrationthathas come.8Indeed,ifthe governmentsimplyweakened,in largepart gave eligiblehouseholdsthe amountofchoosingto do manuallabouron public been chronicallyat the centraland moneyit spends on the pds, this aloneworks,and a paltryRs 11.2underthepds. due to centralisationMorerecently,of morein2005,thePlanningCom- state levels. The accumulationof pro- would entaila monthlytransfermissionestimatedthat the government d,e,500clogspasitslimitedcapabilities 40 percentoftheentirefoodbudgetforaspendsRs 3.65 to transferRe 1 worthof t thepovertyfood,suggestingleakage of about 70 per and all butensuresfurthercent.6Ata recentmeetingoftheNationalallowsthemtobuysucha transferInstead of frontallyaddressingthese nently,of 35pds entitlementDevelopmentCouncil, finance minister deep institutionalissues,we eitherhire the entiremonthlyP Chidambaramremarked,"we need a morepersonnelwho absentthemselves, kilogramsof rice or wheat,even at thepds forthepoor,butunlessitis efficient, or searchfora magicbullet,be itchanges foodgrain inprogrammedesignprogrammesand deliversfood to the poor, the pds thatcould solvethis.Whenall else fails, ess budgetbe transferredto bpl housecould become an albatrossaround our we trotoutisolatedexperiencesin Kerala holds,thoughwe suspectthattheoutcomeneckand an opportunityforrentseekers or pointto theTamilNadu mid-daymeal of such an actionwould be a substantialtoenrichthemselves".7in thelivesof poorpeople.(mdm) scheme as examplesof what is improvementFor supportersof these programmes, feasible.Akintoforeignaid,ess havecreated However,when the expenditureon esslimitedresourcesand faultydesign are significantvestedinterestsamongstlarge and subsidiesin the name of the pooristhe key reasons for the chronic poor numberofcivilsocietyactors,aid agencies, enoughto liftall poor people out of inoftheseprogrammes.Con- multilateraland academics comepoverty,and yetmorethan300 milperformanceorganisationssequently,more resources and better designing and evaluating these pro- lion people remainpoor,it is imperativeeachconvincedthattheirproject thatIndiaundertakesa radicalshiftinthedesignwould resultin betteroutcomes. dingonParadoxically,this logic means that and workwould*finallythe government'sown assessment of thepast.Normally,becauseexperienceis povertyreductionprogrammes.3 April 12, 2008 DmThis content downloaded from 160.39.7.19 on Mon, 30 Nov 2015 17:26:27 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsweeklyEconomic& Political
BUDGET2oo8-mWe believe that centralexpenditures Suchcards,thoughhouseholdbased, are possibilitybutit is disingenuousto argueshouldbe redirectedin principallytwo beingissuedon a pilotbasisundernregs, thatthestructureofservicedeliveryshouldways,viz: (a) First,a schemeof outright rsby,etc, and neitherthe cards northe be hostagetosuchpolarisation.Besides,ittransfersto individuals.10to predictthe pathofpolitical(b) Second, a associatedverificationequipmentare ex- is difficultincreaseinflowof funds to stoexcludequantumtoday.local governments.AnotherelementofIn order to reduce ineligiblebenefi- the poorwould lead to greatermobilisasuch re-directionworth consideringis ciaries,thereare broadlytwoapproaches tion arounda morefocusedsingle-issueenhancedallocationsto thestategovern- thatcan be followed.First,the transfer agendaand gthebroader itselfcouldbe tleneedyissue of decentralisationof expenditure individuals.The nregs, which requires ments(andthisis no meantask,as variousand tax responsibilities,thereis the nar- manuallabouras a conditionofpayment evaluationsof nregs make clear), it isrowissueofwhycertainexpenditures,for is an example of such a self-selection likelythatassertivearticulationofdemandexample watershed managementand mechanism. However, similar charac- will minimisethe exclusionerrors,i e,is non-deliveryroads,whichaccountforaboutone-sixth teristicswill also prevailifthetransferof supportto eligiblebeneof ess expenditures,shouldbe financed in theformofspecificgoods,likefood,in- ficiaries.This view is supportedby theabout the qualityofby centralschemes instead of through steadofcash(butnotifthegoodsaretvs). leave Insuchcircumstances,thenon-poormight the bpl listin Biharwhena pds couponthechoiceofinterventiontodecentralised feel sociallyembarrassedto utilise the schemewas tobe introduced.Theinclusionauthoritiessuch as the states. While benefits.However,thiscomesat the cost of ineligiblebeneficiariescan be limitedthisis notan issuewe address of reducedflexibilityforthepooras well nthispaper.as withan elementof social stigmathat budgetswithinpris,muchas thenumberHow wouldsucha transferschemebe maywellbe undesirable.the ofbpl familiesis restrictedAlternatively,today.14Unlikethe past,thereare poor can be ?and transferby the prisnowrobusttechnologiesformakingcash raj institutions(pris) or similar local can also help to mitigatethe problemoftransfersthatarereliable,transparentand governmentbodies.The currentverifica- The keyissues are identify- tionprocessofbpl beneficiaries,whichis grammeshavean elementofnon-linearity,and determiningthe supposedtobe spro- i e, ionis a sig- videsa guide.Thisis ourpreferredchoice. fitswhilethoseabovedo not.Thisis morenificantthattrans- so withprivategoods,suchas subsidisedgiventhatcashtransfer Itappearsfromtheliteraturechallenge,will createstrongincentives ferstowomen,ratherthanmen,are more grainunderpds and selvesas poor.likelyto increasehouseholdwelfare.Ifso, AwasYojana (iay),thanitis foreducationcouldbe madetothefemale and health,whichhavemorepublicgoodsHere,itis vitalto realisethatestablish- thesetransfersis moreimpor- membersofthefamily.where characteristics.Cash transfersing,an establishinghereligibility.Once feasible,they could be made through thisfeature.However,it need notbe so.an individual'sidentityis established, formal financial channels. There are Forexample,whilea certainportionofthecan be removed financialinclusioninitiativesthataddress fundsdevolvedto local governmentsineligiblebeneficiariesandovertimeas theprocessofverificationis the difficultissue of interfacebetween priscan be designatedfortargetedhouseA smartidentificationand the holds (e g, bpl), each pri can be givenacard, poor and ya workingsimilarElse,theycould flexiblepool thatit can use as per localgroup formalfinancialsystem.13ofthePlanningCommissionis thereforea be made publiclyand transparentlyin circumstances.Fromthis, it can eitherfirstlikethegramsabha.Itmayalso be supplementtransfersto targetedhousestep.11Alreadythepoorin Indiahave forumsthreeid cards,viz,thevoterid card,thebpl prudenttoleavesuchdecisionstothepris. holds, or supportotherswhich do notcardand theNationalRuralEmploymentqualify under the uniformeligibilityand CaveatsGuaranteeScheme(nregs) job card.Ad- thusmitigatditionallyin some states,the poor will A decentralisedprogrammedoes bring to be deservingof benefits,have a healthinsurancecard underthe with it certainrisks,mostcruciallythe ingthenon-linearity.BimaYojana(rsby)and possibilityofcapturebylocal thatSwasthyaa PDSsmartcard.We seemto believethat is especiallyso for cash transferpro- can be movedtodirecttransfers?To beginthe proliferationof povertyprogrammes grammeswhichare akintodistributionof with,we offerfourcandidatesinprinciple,and ess shouldbe matchedbyan equiva- privategoods thatare equallyvalued by viz, (a) pds forfoodand fuel,(b) fertiliserlentprofligacyinid cards.In ourview,itis the poor and the elite. Consequently,it subsidies,(c) ruralhousing,i e, iay,andthatthisproliferationofcards can be arguedthatinpoliticallyorsocially (d) self-employment,i e, sgsy.15imperativeTogether,be arrestedandthevariousfunctionalities polarisedsituations,a moveto cashtrans- in the 2008 budget,they account forwithina singleindividualbio- ferswillexcludethepoorcompletelywhile Rs 73,144 crore.What are the benefitsintegratedmetriccard,whichwould be individual the currentarrangementat leastensures that we perceivefromsuch a move tobased as opposed to household-based.12thattheyreceivesomebenefits.This is a directtransfers?& Politicalweekly USBEconomicapril 12, 2008This content downloaded from 160.39.7.19 on Mon, 30 Nov 2015 17:26:27 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions39
BUDGET 2008-OQ -, . --transfersoffera wayofarrestFirst,cash in the hands of the poor dexpandtheirchoicesand eliminate or to microcreditinstitutions.The latter ing the growing immunityin publicthepaternalisminherentin imposingthe are an improvementbut they provide administration.In itself,thecash transfercurrentsetofchoices.In thepast,itcould loans, and chargehighratesof interest, requireslimitedaction on part of thebe argued that thin and monopolised necessaryin orderto recoverhighservic- administration,itto erable ing costs. It would also make the poor tionofbeneficiariesand deliveryofsupto the depredationsof the market;that morecapable of formingthriftsocieties portsincemostofthedecision-makingisfearis lessrealwiththewideravailability and ureofgoodsandservicesinruralIndia.costsof cash rogrammesthe money they receive. Giving them than ess. Cash transferprogrammes civilsociety.autonomyFifth,thé inherentinevitablyimpliesthis.But,who have highinitialfixedcosts but modestinequityin someofdoes not- and will not- makemistakes? subsequentannual costs. For example, the subsidieswould be removed.This isWoulditbe anyworsethanthehundreds the Progresa-Oportunidadesthe case forthe agriculturalprogramme particularlyof thousandsof croresthat have been in Mexico spent 1.34 foreverydollar inputsubsidiessuch as ntinequity eplypaternalisticyear operation,dropped ardsthepoorandthisattitude toonlyfivecentsforeverydollarspenton like Punjab,Haryanaand Gujaratare ahas been supportedby multitudesof aid transfersbythethirdfullyearofoperation. multipleof the amount in states likeastateofaffairsthatcontinues.Morefromour pointof view, Assam,Biharand yforexpedient e of all the above, purposesimportant clientelism,patronage and corruptionaofthetransfersmustbewhichmarketsare very that attend ess would be reducedform, portionpublic tasks,madeincashorcash-equivalents.to(itwouldbe naïvetobelievethattheycanunlikely urth,by limitingeliminated),whichcouldhave signififocusingconstraintsfaced by the poor, manyof natureof accountabilityofpublicservice cantcollateralbenefits.NewfromOxford- . -International Trade andEconomic DevelopmentEssaysin Theoryand PolicySugata Marjit9780195691719 H HHB Rs 745 " SHH HAddressing trade, development, and relatedissues, this volume systematicallyanalyses theadjustment problems faced by a developingcountry as it confronts markets in the rest ofthe world. HH H M jj H9780195692976 HB Rs675 HHIHH HThisbook comparestwo statesinthe Northeastwithdifferentsocio-political-a relativelytrajectoriesorderlyMizoramand a troubledManipur- in ordertounderstandthe sourcesof politicalturmoilinthe region H H H HBH KH H H H 1 mNoPrÄM.SajjadHassang §QIhhh H''9780195695908yWÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊJ MI Hj l H 1Building Legitimacy- *Dangerous Deterrento***» NuclearandWeapons Proliferation/ Conflictin South AsiaS. Paul Kapur H h 1 H H HW MH HI Hflk H H HHB Rs 625This book discusses the acquisition of nuclearweapons by India and Pakistan and its effecton security of the South Asian region. Theauthor contends that nuclear weapons havesignificantlydestabilized the sinessModelsofFuture3 i NetworkPB Rs4959780195692532,,,The '"d'aReport2008 proposes'" /-einnovativemodelsdesignedforinfrastructuresuch as telecom urbantransportsystem saleable'******* etc *hataresus*?inablean econom'ca' to Pressis a departmentoftheUniversityofOxford.It versity presswww.oup.co.in2/n Ansari Road, Daryaganj,167,VidyanagariMarg,Ph: 23273841-2,23253647Fax:011-23277812email: kata700091Ph: 66973891-93;Fax: 022-26521133 .comemail:kolkata.in@oup.comNew Delhi 110002SantacruzKalina,(East),PlotNo. Ai-5,BlockGP,SectorV, 112107;Fax: ementand termsaresubjectto alterationwithoutnotice.Note: ce;territorialincluding4 aprii. 12,2008 GEEH Economic& PoliticalweeklyThis content downloaded from 160.39.7.19 on Mon, 30 Nov 2015 17:26:27 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
.BUDGET2008-00in schooland delayingthe changes.AsLevy(2006)notes,"programmewill and retentionIs therea riskthatsuch transfersto reducetheirown marriageage beyond18years".19lead essactivityimportant".22It is importantto providethe resourcesthereare now manyexamplesof cash Decentralisation toMexico'sProgresa- Local Governmentstransferand capacityto delivergood isformorehasbeenstudiedintolocal governments,a conmoney lyspacedceptappearsUtopian .(2001)nregs, thiseleonlyMcClaffertywell-functioningprivateMaro (2006) conclude that the "pro- butionsystem,whichis notpresentfora menthas been othaveoverhalfthecurvancetoouristhecag's obserany significantgrammeargumenti e,Rs42,147crore, vationthatadequate,administrativeeffecton adultlabourforceparticipation rentlevelofexpenditure,staffin 11ofthetop30 ess is on basicservices has notbeen appointedand insteadoverandleisuretime".toeducationandhealth, workedblockdevelopmentTherehavebeen a fewschemesakinto relatingofficers(bdos)primarilyin the past, albeit includingchild developmentand water havebeengivenadditionalcharge.directcash onalities.The mostsignificant supply.an Indiahaveseentransferfinancialwouldneed to beincreasedscheme,programmeaccountability- has many of the design featuresof enrolmentbutnotnecessarilybetterout- put in place, in additionto the ata decentralisedsupportexample,Jalanand Glinskaya accountabilityimplesincebeneficiarieswould (2005) question the extentof benefits mentation structurewould hopefullywaswelltargeted,theprihadsignificantto theess. In health engender.Here, thereare myriadunrebe self-selected;say thatare attributableinthechoiceofworksand theadministra- too, failuresare rife,as documentedre- solved problemsthat are oftenpurelyoftheprogrammeand centlyin an exhaustiveimplementation administrativetionand oversightin asBank,supportedby less, ndia.20Sinha (2007) pointouttheinconsistencymanner,throughthe gram , thegovernmenttransparentofIndia'sThese are functionssabha.Sadly(butgiventhehistorythatcouldbe done in by the local governmentand is their povertyin manycountries.ofthesefeatureshave notbeen op- responsibilityIn India, tolocalgovernmentsand tionalisedthestateTheofclassificaphase. publicconstitutionallyrestructuringaccountingand education handigarhhave agreed to introduce a concurrentand delivered and comparableacross entitiesneeds toresponsibilitylevelstatead- proceed concomitantlya smartcard based deliverysystemto largelythroughthedistrictwith increaseddeliverfoodgrainsunderthepds on a pilot ministration.It is our contentionthatit is esourcesina few comparabilitybasis. The rsby, which provides bpl moreeffectivecouldalso assistin izenoversightfamilieswithcollectivecoverup chedtoand is thereforedesirableon30,000,(including panchayats).21beingaccountabilityThiswill: (a) Reducetheburdenon dis- bothcounts.Further,selecteddistrictsof Delhi, Haryanaandas Levy(2006):notés,has trictadministrations,whichnowcopewith "facilitatingaccess to budgetdata on allRajasthan.TheRajasthangovernmentitthemorethana 100 ess, each programmesannouncedthat willextend scheme implementingand.[m]akingtheevaluationson its own accordand withidiosyncraticto all its districtsreportingrequirements, ofall suchprogrammespublic(ormakingto,interalia, public the lack of evaluations/'wouldgiveRs 1,500as incentiveto all families (b) Allowlocal governmentscovered under the health insurance takeadvantageofcontextualinterventionsalso help improvethe qualityof debatescheme upon opening a bank account that the centralgovernmentmightnot and, d in thename knowabout.The qualityof thé eventual overtime.23There outcomewoulddependon theadvantagesofa femalememberofthefamily.17andthedifferen- Conclusionshave also been some experimentswith ofsuchlocalinformationtialextentofresourcesuch as the pdsenhanced monitoring,and practicalleakagein thelocal BesidesitsstrongnormativeKeroseneour approach has oneimplementationprocessas comparedto underpinnings,couponsin Biharand the Jancentralised largeadvantage;itmustbejudgedagainstFinally,this year a small theexistingpoorlyperformingPariyojana.18central sectorpilot project,called the process. Limitingthe numberof pro- the statusquo, whichinvolvesa bar ofinforma- performanceCashTransferSchemeforthe grammeswillreducethecurrentConditionalthatshouldbe has beenlaunchedwhere"cash awarenessabout intotheunknown.One suggestionwillbe providedto théfamilyofTheresultingtransferwouldthe mother)on entitlementsthe girlchild (preferablyschemeinthoseamongstthepooris likelyto be egirl increasethemobilisationofbeneficiaries. districtswherethe currentperformancefulfillingofthegirlSuch decentralisationneeds to be of ess is especially poor and wherechild,viz,birthand registrationto school accompaniedby associatedinstitutional povertyis tion,Economic& PoliticalweeklyQ259april12, 2008This content downloaded from 160.39.7.19 on Mon, 30 Nov 2015 17:26:27 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions41
BUDGET2008-09ofexistingexpendishouldbe an inherentpartSystem for the Social Sector Development 21 In India,the"crowding-out"performanceSchemesin the Country(TenthFive-YearPlan),turesby local governmentsis a l
lion people or 70 million households. If the Rs 1,80,000 crore spent on* ess and food, fertiliser and fuel subsidies were dis- tributed equally to all these 70 million households, it would mean a monthly transfer of over Rs 2,140 per household. This is more than the poverty line income for rural households and more than 70
