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The objective represents those elements or qualities thatevery war has in common. The subjective refers to thosequalities that change from war to war.7 There ispermanence to the objective nature of war that isrepresented in the enduring elements that all wars, largeand small, share. These enduring qualities includefriction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder and danger andproduce interactions that are a complex mixture of causesand effect that cannot be individually isolated ordominated by technological solutions. Though theseelements of the objective nature of war are always presentthey vary in degree from war to war based on thesituation.Like the weather, certain elements arecommon-pressure, humidity, wind, etc.--but they varyconstantly; it is the same in war.8 The subjective natureof war consists of qualities that vary to a greater degreeand consist of things like the political purpose of theconflict, the types of armed forces used or the weaponsand tactics employed. It is the subjective factors thatcause the objective to vary in degree.War, as an aspect of politics, extends beyond the winningof battles and campaigns. Winning battles is a means tothe end but does not solely drive the outcome in war. Theachievement of strategic objectives in war includesmilitary action considered in concert with all the otherinstruments of influence a nation-state or entity possesses.In an ideal sense, the requirements of policy can lead toabsolute wars or wars for more limited policy objectives.In reality, the requirements of policy may be almostinfinitely various, war can surely be of any kind, not onlyof two.95

The American ApproachHistory reveals that violent clashes of interests ofteninclude irregular forces or factions that exist outside theauthority of established states. War in the Shadows, byRobert Asprey, documents over two thousand years ofconflict between regular and irregular forces. In 1965,Dr. Bernard Fall described the twentieth century as “TheCentury of Small Wars.” He cited 48 small wars from thefirst 65 years of the twentieth century that, in toto,involved as many people and as many casualties as eitherone of the two world wars.10 This is no insignificant pointand suggests that conflicts like World War II representboth an aberration as well as a refinement of the actualtradition of war. The traditional form of war is actuallymore irregular.In 1964, Bernard Fall warned that “Americanreaders will find to their surprise that their variousseemingly ‘new’ counter-insurgency gambits, fromstrategic hamlets to large-scale pacification, are mererehashes of old tactics to which helicopters, weed killers,and rapid firing rifles merely add a newdimension without changing the character of thestruggle.”11Asprey, Fall, Clausewitz, and otherdistinguished students of war all echo the sentiment thatasymmetric adaptation during war is timeless. Regardlessof the actors involved, war is fundamentally a strugglebetween “ hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills,each trying to impose itself upon the other.”12The American way of war has predominantly been shapedby conflicts characterized by the use regular armies.Throughout history, states have made war against otherstates in what most have come to see as conventionalwarfare. That is, the nation-states normally fought their6

peers and near-peers. In this sense, and particularly fromthe American perspective, the term “conventional” in thecontext of military operations has come to be synonymouswith “regular” or “traditional” combat.The reality is that war will not always follow convention;actors other than conventional combatants will engage incombat, the weak will attack the strong and the strongwill use unconventional methods against the strong. EvenAmerican history does not reflect the argument thatconventional war is the most common or even mostsignificant, defining type of warfare13.However,throughout American history the default setting formilitary preparedness was based upon the prevailing viewof what was considered conventional or regular. SinceWorld War II the American military, has beenpredominantly organized, structured, and trained to fightan enemy very much like the image it saw in the mirror.This concept will address a broader view of war beyondthe microcosm of modern conventional war. It willaddress what the U.S. military has for some number ofyears termed “irregular.” In truth, warfare is not trulyconventional or unconventional. It is not regular orirregular. Warfare in reality has a certain hybrid naturethat is a variation in what is “conventional” and what isother than conventional. In fact, in the same conflict,both forms will exist simultaneously.Irregular Threats and InsurgencyThe term irregular is used in a broad sense to refer to alltypes of unconventional methods of violence. Irregularthreats include acts of a military, political, psychological,and economic nature, conducted by both indigenousactors and non-state actors for the purpose of eliminating7

or weakening the authority of a local government orinfluencing an external power, and using primarilyirregular methods. Those groups that practice irregularmethods and tactics do not consider themselves“irregular.” They are “irregular” from the perspective ofa western nation-state such as the United States.The framework in which these irregular threats exist willbe unique to each future intervention. Brigadier FrankKitson took the practical approach of an experiencedpractitioner when addressing the difficult problemsconcerning the matter of terminology in his 1971publication of Low Intensity Operations. It is not easy tocover every set of circumstances by exactly definedterms, nor in the last resort is it even necessary to do so.14This concept will focus on insurgency andcounterinsurgency operations. The Marine Corps viewsinsurgency as the most dangerous and likely irregularthreat it will encounter in the future. This concept willavoid attempting to address every aspect of stabilityoperations across the spectrum of conflict. Though thepurpose or ends of a stability operation with differ, asthey will in counterinsurgency, peace operations, andmore benign nation building efforts, the ways and meanswill share common requirements for reaching practicalsolutions.Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities or occupiers inwhich the non-ruling group consciously uses politicalresources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustainthe basis of a legitimacy of one or more aspects ofpolitics.15 Insurgency can follow more conventionaloperations as in Operation Iraqi Freedom but historicallyit has developed from a relatively peaceful situation.With the absence of violence, subversion exists which8

consists of all measures taken by sections of a populationagainst the ruling authorities in order to overthrow thoseauthorities or coerces them to do things they wish not todo. Though the distinction between insurgency andsubversion seems clear on paper in practice this cleardivergence does not exist. The transition from relativepeace to war can be gradual and confusing.16 The harderthe insurgency is to identify in its early stages the moredifficult the problem becomes for the counterinsurgent.Regardless of how quickly an insurgency developsviolence is typically preceded by a period of ‘stirrings’,when the insurgent operates largely within the bounds ofthe law as well as on the edge of legality throughsubversive tactics.If an insurgency is a struggle between an insurgent groupand government authorities over the acceptance of thelegitimacy of the populace then where does the strugglebegin and over what? Insurgency begins with a cause.Conceptually, there are two aspects of a cause: theunderlying social environment (or some similar “passive”element that provides the background context) and acatalyst, which is an “active” element of the cause. Forinstance, widespread discontent represents a passivebackground to a cause for insurgency development andcan lead to action and collective violence.17 The peoplecome to a point that they believe they can have animproved situation by overthrowing the existing regimeor evicting an occupier. However, passive elements canbe addressed and do not always lead directly to aninsurgency without an agent that serves sparkinsurrection. In most cases, the insurgent elites interjectthe catalyst element by making people aware of theiroppressed state and by committing acts that function asthe catalytic agent. In this sense, either the insurgentelites or the acts they commit are the catalytic agents for9

insurrection.coercive.These agents could be constructive orThe government or authority derives its legitimacy fromthe acceptance of the people. Only by fulfilling theexpectations of the people can the acting authoritymaintain its legitimacy and thus its authority. There aretwo problems with maintaining legitimate authority. First,the expectations of the people are not static. They aredynamic, constantly being influenced through thecompetition of ideas.The second problem withmaintaining legitimate authority is that the expectations ofthe people are not uniform. Different groups within anenvironment have differing expectations of legitimacy.When an acting authority is unable or unwilling toaddress the perceived or real inequities of the people, thepeople often resort to some form of violent rebellionagainst those in power. Insurgents are involved in apolitical struggle that could be based on ideology or onmore pragmatic issues or a combination. Their actionswill usually attempt to “de-legitimize,” in the eyes of thepeople, the authority that they are in conflict with in orderto bring about social or political change. For a populace tosupport a violent rebellion, they must clearly see thatthere is futility in continuing the social debate within theframework of the existing authority.18 Likewise, if actionis taken to meet the needs of the people, even after arebellion has begun, the insurgency may be underminedand the insurgents ultimately convinced or coerced towork within the system.In general, every endeavor involving humans will possesssome inherent weakness that can be exploited.Insurgency is no different and the history of such affairsbears this out. No two insurgencies will possess the sameweaknesses and these points of possible exploitation can10

only be recognized with a thorough understanding of thecontext of a specific insurgency. Unfortunately, potentialweaknesses are most vulnerable early on in a campaignwhen they are more difficult to recognize or understand.Countering Irregular Threats and CounterinsurgencyAs alluded to earlier, Kitson did not ignore the differencesbetween potential threats but went to great lengths tofocus on the practical commonalities that existed inreality. He treats the counters to threats in the same way.Kitson compared that although counterinsurgencies andpeacekeeping are fundamentally different, there is asurprising similarity in the outward forms of many of thetechniques involved.19Countering irregular threats requires that the militarymust have an understanding of the particular character ofthe conflict, its context, and its participants. Typicallythis is more difficult in a conflict involving irregularthreats as opposed to conventional forces. The U.S.military must have a solid understanding of the catalyticagents involved in order to properly deal with thesituation. Essentially, the counterinsurgency effort worksto diminish or remove the catalytic agent while alsoworking to improve the background situation (the passiveelement of the cause) that fueled the rebellion to beginwith.The Security Environment and Policy ObjectivesFuture conflict will not be dominated by tests of strengththat characterize Industrial War.20 Future conflict will bedominated by wars fought among the people where the11

objective is not to crush but to influence ideas and wills.Throughout the last half of the twentieth century, theUnited States national security strategy rested ondeterrence in a bipolar world. The delicate stability thatexisted during the Cold War era was characterized byelaborate deterrence measures by the two super-powers,such as the development and fielding of hugeconventional military capabilities, along with thermonuclear weapons and delivery systems. To maintain thedelicate balance, the two super-powers could not engageeach other directly in combat as it would almost certainlylead to a war of almost unimaginable consequences.Therefore, the conflict that ensued predominantly took theform of “proxy wars,” low-intensity conflict, or militaryoperations other then war. Paradoxically, most of theUnited States military was focused on fightingconventional wars—and therefore developed aconventional force, which was not optimized for fightingwars where combat operations were not decisive.The collapse of the Soviet Union prompted the emergenceof a more complex and unpredictable world in which theCold War concepts of security and deterrence have lessrelevance.21 A new security environment replaced theone for which the United States military had beenorganized, trained, and equipped, and in this newenvironment irregular challenges have become dominant.Though irregular threats may not be new, they will likelybe the predomina

the anticipated conflict in the Pacific, the Marine Corps concluded that the United States could not afford the luxury of avoiding that which was incredibly difficult. Rather than avoiding the problem, the Navy-Marine Corps team attacked it. The result was a Tentative Manual for Landing Operations published in 1934.