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The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and ImplicationsAuthor(s): Mark T. GilderhusSource: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, Presidential Doctrines (Mar., 2006), pp.5-16Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and CongressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552742 .Accessed: 19/08/2011 13:21Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at ms.jspJSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.Blackwell Publishing and Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress are collaborating with JSTORto digitize, preserve and extend access to Presidential Studies Quarterly.http://www.jstor.org

ARK T. GILDERHUSTexas ChristianUniversitysince its articulationinpresents a brief history of the Monroe Doctrineas a statementto Europeanin oppositionin the Americas,intrusionsitaunder veltjustificationforAmericantrade and goodwillthe Greatandthe Second istrationRoosevelt'sonset of the Cold War, perceivedin countries such as Guatemala,in idealisticcouchedracy,meansthe variousrhetoricalCold Warsuchstylerhetoricemphasizingof the Monroewhatthey understoodas liciesoftakeasregardeda byandstrategictookpreferences,asif tlyholds the Lyndon B. Johnson Chair in the department of history at Texas ChristianMark T. GilderhusU.S.-Mexicanunder WilsonRelationsand Revolution:include Diplomacyversity. His publicationsin the WesternPan AmericanVisions: AmericanRelationsA Historiographicaland The Second Century: l Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (March) 5? 2006 Center for the Study of the Presidencytheduringand high principle,upholdingsometimesdefenseinterests.in 1823 establishedof ithlaterin the languagesubstantialpeace.strategicthe s nationalDoctrineaffirmationsLatinimperativesthe Dominicanand Chile. ThoughRepublic,typicallyto solidarityPan-Americancommitmentsand democas aDoctrineserved U.S. policy makersconsistentlyCuba,and after. TypicallybecameWar,Later withtheof nonintervention.led to a series of new interventionsthe The Monroea1823.conceivedUniandandsince

6I PRESIDENTIALSTUDIESQUARTERLY /March 2006as notcouldsame.functionEuropeans,openvariedtheatheto miin the Westernpurposeswantedspecialobjectivesa sensedisciplinemakers,policyofthe meanssure,theseofandgoalsmakersPolicyin areasbeprojectedin needU.S.Toof tsin nwithoutpaternalisticoversightsupervision.emerged in response to the exigencies of European politicsIn efforts to put the world back together again, theWars.The Monroe Doctrineat the end of the NapoleonicGreatthatPowers,of the TreatytowithAlliancePrussians,in 1815 formedandorder,peace,the Austrians,is,of ParisstatustheThreequo.turnedintotermsthean r,yearsof France, a newlythe admissionandRussians,the QuadruplecommittedtheQuintupleunder the restoredmonarchyBourbonkings.For good reason in the dcausedJohntookforcesthe Ottoman1821,things.downactionarmiestoalso mightharbor similar ambitionsSpanishAmericanempire.ofthe UnitedAs ClaySan Mart?nveryhavetooattributedbutFor eirprayersinfuseduponbe.hiseducation,intohishas or shall be unfurled,herscantButshealllevelshighthe Greatto theirtheirseminaland Jos? onof the Floristandardher [the cclesiastical,theirIn a endentmilitaryandtheemployedto the acquisitionability"Whereverthere willtheRevolution. . .andof nitionfaithalsoactionsSuchleaders and ruin his diplomacy. enatewherin itikTreaty withAdams.Secretarystates mightU.S.indicatedtheyin contrast,leaders,theto wonderemulateourrevolutionarytoTheleaders such as Sim?n Bol?varcopiedourimportanceof the 1819 nguageasin 1818, Latin Americanobservedandrevoltsinspired a great deal of interest amongsuch as CongressmanHenry Clay ofStates.themregardedKentucky,ofin Greece.in the New World,wars for independenceIndeed, many,The Latin Americana rebellionstate,of Troppauwhenevera seriesin Spain.uprisingofthe scitizensanagainstthe U.S.Adams,Consequentlyleaders fearedEuropeanatinsurrectionistAustrianin effortsTurksQuincyof the French upheaval,mostto tates] heart, her benedicof monsterstodestroy."

/ THE MONROEGilderhusIn the spring of newthelaterand expulsionAmerica.Spanishto therecognitionand Mexicobia,the defeatinPresidentgovernmentsothers.of SpanishMonroeand trade. He worriedarmies openedup hile,Adams,I 7consequentlywithbeginningDOCTRINEtodiplomatsabout Britishgoodwillespeciallyrivalry. British policy,at the same time, entered a period of flux. Followingthe Congressof Vienna,Lordhadinthe foreign secretary,believedthe striantheriskoftheofreactedCanning,in othercountries,a long strugglehad opsof cision.commandofof pabilitieson such advantagesTheby takingministerforeignconnive with King Ferdinand VII in efforts to restoreSuch an outcome would nullify British dto capitalizewithin a conversationSubsequentlyminister,economicleaders intendedthat his former allies mightauthority in the Americas.ambitionsU.S.the chRatherdomination.Napoleonicworriedwhenin Spain, whereespeciallyInNapoleon.defeatingin Augustramificationsofoftrade.and Richard1823, Canningthe FrenchininvolvementSpain.theRush,WhenRushexpressed his view that fundamental British interests required that Great Britain opposeFrench intervention or seizure of territory in the New World, Canninginquired whetherainthe United States y. Further,as a sign of good faith, he suggested a pledge of self-denialin whichthe British y. words,restclause;anHeasMeanwhile,French diplomatsinterventionofthe intentionsdistrustedtheagainstadvicepreferred"a cockboatCanningsignedofthe proposalforwardedSeekingintentionanyinahim,lost interestAmerica.promiseofa Britishforthemselves.he set off a flurry of high-levelcontactedformerpresidentsfavored acting in tandem with theas an ally, the UnitedStates hadcontrast,as commercialstatementindependentthe wakeinAdams,estateMonroeBritainGreatof the Britishthe Polignacin Spanish1823,both of whomEurope.forrealseekingtoWashington,in OctoberJefferson and James Madison,that witharguing essentiallyBritish,in xingunilaterHeofdislikedor CubaTexasinsteadof policyactappearing,man-of-war."1in a joint declaration. On October 9, British andin which France made a pledgeMemorandumNevertheless,rumorsofa Frenchfleetpoisedand KennethG. Paterson,1. All the foregoingappear in ThomasJ.J. Garry Clifford,quotationsto 1920,American Foreign Relations: A History101-03.5th ed. (Boston: Houghton2000),Mifflin,Hagan,see DexterPerkins'sFor more details on the Europeanand the framing of the MonroeDoctrine,backgroundrev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown,the roleclassic work, A History1963), chaps. 1, 2. Onof theMonroe Doctrine,see Lars Schoultz,Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin Americaof racist assumptions,MA: Harvard1998).Press,University(Cambridge,

I PRESIDENTIALSTUDIESQUARTERLY /March 20068and ready to moveaClay,the New Worldagainstof Latinchampionself-appointedtered on the interest of Tsar AlexanderaintoAmerica,I in extendingStates and putin the Unitedraised dterritoryAlaska.In closegressto aStatesfreeandnottothe Old hree essentialbyanybythe Conthe Unitedcontinents,Europeanthebyareand maintain,assumedcolonizationfuturetomessagefirst committed"the hichconditionMonroe'srecommendation,of noncolonizationindependentsecondAdams'2 set forthpolicybewithconformanceon DecemberhenceforthThepowers."a policy of "hands off" while arguing that the monarchicalsystem ofthatAmerica"thatandof"is essentially different from"any attempt" byto"extendtoourtheirpeaceto re""anofevidenceappeardispositionunfriendlytoward the UnitedStates." The third recalled Washington'sfarewell address by embraca"Inthe wars of the Europeanfromaffairs:ofabstentionEuropean politicaling policyin orpart,it comportdoesour policy to do so." A related policy of "no transfer" already had taken shape inIn his1823 when Adams warned Spain against selling Cuba to Great Britain.Aprilwithwords,pableU.S.allForthe mostleaders,LatinwhileAmericanleaders,fromits bosom."scantexpressedanStatesarrogantsentthethe UnitedStatesunderstandingto defendMexico,Monroeinternationalits own basicFollowingmosttheCuba,duringandLatinconto enforcepowerintheforquestto ageof it whenandatAmericansfirstthe UnitedStates rejectedthe Monroefor upholdingCentrala ialthe UnitedStatesto doverywithoutlittle,exceptinterests.3the initialAmericansofADoctrine.of Austriaalliance. Ironically, the responsibilitythe result of a common concern withupon the Royal British Navy,for maintainingand free trade. As historian John ningexpressed hightheir offers of militarydevolvedthe Monroeworthygainedlevels of interest but then lost guidedexpectationlacked the naval and militarythat ninterestvonKlemensit asthe Unitedwithconnectionthe edIn their view,contrast,gravitatecastForeignI of nderit.of rt,sametheonce"Cuba,ofstir, the arecedednineteenthpassedinto the backgroundcentury.outof vogueIndeed,as aexceptforforcompelling2. Perkins, Monroe Doctrine,ed., The Evolution of Our Latin-Americanchap. 2; James W Gantenbein,(New York: ColumbiaPress,1950), 323-26.Policy: A DocumentaryHistoryUniversityA Hemisphere Apart: The Foundations3. John J. Johnson,of United States Policy Toward Latin America(Baltimore:Press,1990), 80-81.Johns HopkinsUniversity

Gilderhus / THE MONROE tionsfollowingMexico'snationalrouteto Asia,U.S.Destiny,"in ewnorthernofideologiinsouthamongsearchtothehalf ofabsorbedintereststatesinof GuadalupeStatesmerchantsin addingsucceededgroupthe Treatyandtheresultedexpansionofalsoofpowerthe Unitednationsthe British,a constellationterritorialprethoseInstead,growinga ent.newStates.theagainstwith MexicoCubaneitherUnitedAmericanthe ights"Manifestthe Warterritory.ownersslaveforties withhunger,asthe lturallyopportunitiesand politicalsuchcalanddistantGeographically( 9aofshorterthe Union.Early in his presidency, James Knox Polk briefly resurrected the Monroe Doctrineand invoked it in 1845 as a warning against British and French meddlingin Texas orationthe UnitedStates.Similarly,at the end of the Civil War, Secretary of State WilliamHenry Seward warned the Frenchto cease and desist in their interventionin Mexicobut withoutexplicitly mentioningthe Monroe Doctrine. Whenthe French later withdrewtheir forces, they left the haplessto tU.S.of urbanization,States morethe Unitedandpowerstheforthemin houselateraccomplishment,withitsemphasistoto eandandDC.tradedistrustbut ericanism,inWashington,whethereffortsthe mostForthrustof Pan-Americanism,advocateconsideredconsequencesthe great EuropeanonConferenceabydiplomacy"changeemphasisa staunchthey resisted Blaine's mosta commerciala nsuinga newofformG.Latina customsandful of such nthroughonesentofpurposein .of uncertaintyWorld,inof Statetheinto the imperial strugglethe NewpresidencySecretarybydelegatestoandin the late officialsin 1889 at the first InternationalspecificallySummonedtheSantoat a ion,whencentury,andforeignresourcesandfor marketsa hift in U.S.A paradigmin a estthe midthe maininInUnion.direcpeace.3Monroe Doctrine,chaps. 3,4.in my book, The Second Century:of this essay also appearin the remainderof the themes5. Mostsee it for elaboraDE: ScholarlyAmerican Relations Since 1889U.S.-LatinResources,2000);(Wilmington,see Walterthe "new diplomacy,"tion and clarification.OnLaFeber, The New Empire: An InterpretationofAmerican Expansion,1860-1898LaFeber, The AmericanPress,1963); Walter(Ithaca, NY: Cornell Universityvol. 2, in The Cambridge History(New York:Search for Opportunity,1865-1913,of American Foreign Relationsto the New,2dL. Beisner,From the Old Diplomacy1865-1900,Press,1993); RobertUniversityCambridgeIL: Harlan Davidson,ed. (Arlington1986).Heights,4. Perkins,