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The nexusbetween statelegitimacy, andsecurity andconflict3There are a number of reasons for the collapse of the Somali state, but colonialgovernance systems and subsequent post-colonial state formation processeshave been a key source of Somalia’s conflict and fragility. Here, it is importantto bear in mind the unique dynamics of Somali society, particularly its historicallack of centralised political authority and its clan-based governance reliant onconsultation and consensual decision-making.During colonial times, British Somaliland was a protectorate, with Britishcontrol over the territory being little more than a paper claim. In practice, thismeant minimal overt colonial interference or interruption of traditional structuresand systems. As a result, traditional institutions remained functional and relativelyunimpeded.In contrast, Somalia’s colonisation by the Italians was far more profound. Acolonial administration of direct rule was established, the number of Italians livingin Somalia rose, and a degree of assimilation of Somalis into Italian culture waspursued. Consequently, traditional Somali structures and systems were disruptedand undermined, and were superseded by a colonial centralised governmentstructure modeled on Italy’s system.Somaliland: Achieving peace and statelegitimacy through political compromiseAfter declaring its independence from Somalia, Somaliland’s peacebuilding andstate formation efforts were driven by traditional Somali norms of governance,notably consultation and consensual decision-making, and informed by9State fragility in Somaliland and Somalia: A contrast in peace and state building

customary values (Kaplan, 2008). Somaliland’s society-led approach allowedfor broad participation and bottom-up democratisation, and establishment oflocally-relevant government institutions that have achieved a high degree ofsocietal cohesion and state legitimacy (Kaplan, 2008).At independence, Somaliland installed a SNM government, led by SNMcentral committee chair Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur. Tuur’s governmentwas given a limited mandate to lead the first two years of post-war statereconstruction and was tasked with establishing security within Somaliland’sborders, ensuring political accommodation of all clans, rebuilding governmentinstitutions, drafting a constitution, revitalising the economy, and restoring basicservices (Bradbury, 2008).By 1993, when the SNM government’s mandate ended, ongoing securitychallenges meant Tuur’s government had made little progress with addressingthese state-building priorities. At an inter-clan conference held in Borama,Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, a compromise non-SNM candidate, was elected to leada new civilian government. Egal’s government inherited a plethora of challenges:inter-clan conflict and mistrust, disruption of imports and exports (particularlylivestock exports), insecurity and lawlessness, dysfunctional governmentinstitutions, negligible government revenue, a significant post-war financial crisis,and urban infrastructure challenges (Bradbury, 2008).Establishing security and law and order was Egal’s chief priority. During thesecurity stabilisation process he introduced, there were several incidences ofinter-clan conflict. There had been political differences among Somaliland’sclans prior to the independence declaration as some had supported Barre’sgovernment, while others had supported the SNM. Challenges to Egal’sleadership also emerged, coming mainly from armed clan militias loyal to formerpresident Tuur.A number of inter-clan reconciliation conferences were held throughoutSomaliland to address these inter-clan hostilities, to negotiate politicalsettlements between conflicting parties, and to undertake a national dialogue toachieve consensus on what system of political representation should be adoptedfor the country (Kaplan, 2008). This was a long and uncertain process, aimed atreaching a power-sharing agreement that made peace more profitable for theparties than instability (Clapham, 2017).With no external assistance reaching Somaliland due to non-recognition ofits independence, these conferences were funded by local businessmen andcommunities. Importantly, no one financing source was dominant (de Waal,2015). Following traditional consensus-based decision-making, the result ofthese consultative and participatory conferences was a bottom-up, culturallyrooted, locally-owned and funded peacebuilding and state-building processthat was considered legitimate by the people of Somaliland. As the processwas entirely domestically funded, it also encouraged self-reliance and adistinct Somaliland national identity (Kaplan, 2008). The societal cohesivenessestablished through this process has created the space needed for politicalcompetition to grow (Kaplan, 2008).The political settlements achieved an enabling environment to start Egal’ssecurity stabilisation process, which included disarmament, demobilisation,reintegration of ex-combatants and clan militias, and the formation of a nationalarmy and police force. This enabled Egal to establish a monopoly on the10State fragility in Somaliland and Somalia: A contrast in peace and state building

legitimate use of force within Somaliland’s borders. Thereafter, his governmentshifted to focus on rebuilding government institutions and providing basicservices.In addition to the broadly legitimate, inter-clan governance system developedin Somaliland’s early years, other factors contributing to Somaliland’s statebuilding success included a relatively homogenous population (the population isabout 70 percent Isaaq), a shared fear of Somalia, modest disparities in wealth,and a lack of external interference which strengthened the accountability ofleaders to the people of Somaliland (Kaplan, 2008). The political elites also hadhistorical friendships and trust between one another, which discouraged resortto political violence (Philips, 2013).The nature of Somaliland’s political settlement is, however, essentially anagreed division of economic opportunities between business elites. Politicaland economic inclusivity underpins the fragile and changing balance of powerbetween competing local actors (Philips, 2013). The distribution of economicbenefits heavily influences political processes, including elite bargaining.Aspects of modern state apparatus have been integrated into Somaliland’sgovernance systems in order to overcome some of the more problematicelements of traditional governance, such as clannism (Kaplan, 2008). In 2001, anew democratic constitution was adopted, and a multi-party system replacedthe clan-based traditional governance. Since then, the balance of clan interestshas been re-oriented by inter-party politics. In an effort to minimise clannism, thenew constitution limits the number of political parties to three and requires eachparty to have broad support in each of Somaliland’s six regions, necessitatingforging of inter-clan coalitions (Kaplan, 2008). The government’s ability to deliverpeace and security within Somaliland’s borders is a key factor in its persistinglegitimacy. Business elites continue to control national politics, however, whichhas implications for state effectiveness, among other things.Somalia: Lawlessness and the collapse ofthe central governmentIn contrast, the Western-style centralised system of government imposed onSomalia while it was an Italian colony continued in force post-independence. Astrong centralised government is completely antithetical to Somalis’ traditionalpolitical structures and processes, and this sharp disconnect between traditionaland centralised governance has created a fragile political, social, and economicenvironment in post-colonial Somali state formation.Somalia’s post-war peacebuilding and state-building process took a verydifferent route to that of Somaliland. Following the defeat of Barre’s militaryregime, the United Somali Congress (USC) clan-based militia, which had foughtalongside the SNM to topple Barre, seized control of Mogadishu. Barre’s fallcaused the collapse of Somalia’s government – the central authority of theSomali state disappeared and state institutions stopped functioning. Politicalinstability and inter-clan armed conflicts engulfed Somalia in the immediate postwar period. The USC splintered into two rival clan militias, led by Ali Mahdi andGeneral Aideed, both from the Hawiye clan. Mahdi was elected president of the11State fragility in Somaliland and Somalia: A contrast in peace and state building

centralised government, but his legitimacy was challenged by Aideed and others,who fought for control over Mogadishu.In 1992, a war-induced famine transformed the localised Somali conflict intoan international crisis. Both the US and the United Nations (UN) were prepared tointervene in Somalia to restore peace and stability and to ensure the delivery ofrelief supplies to starving Somalis. The UN Security Council imposed an armsembargo on Somalia in 1992 and established the UN Operation in Somalia(UNSOM), which was later expanded to form the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), aUS-led humanitarian intervention (CRD, 2008). More than 30,000 troops weredeployed to restore law and order, end the famine, and create an enablingenvironment for humanitarian assistance programmes. UNITAF was dissolvedfollowing an externally-sponsored peace process led by Ethiopia, and UNSOMwithdrew from Somalia in 1995 after having failed to accomplish its mission.Nevertheless, the international intervention had failed to reconstitute the Somalistate and Somalia’s conflict continued (CRD, 2008).Subsequent externally-driven and internationallyThe repeated externallyfunded peace processes were attempted, includingin Djibouti (1991 and 2000), Ethiopia (1993 and 1996),driven and fundedand Kenya (2002) (CRD, 2008). These efforts haveattempts to impose ayielded little success in terms of stabilisation andWestern-style centralisedstate formation. The central government has no localgovernment on Somalialegitimacy and only survives because of the protectionand support provided by foreign forces; in turn, thehave not yieldedgovernment lacks accountability to its own people.peace, stability, or localPolitical factions and clan-based militias continue tolegitimacyfight for control. While clan-based militias are seeminglystrong enough to dislodge others, they lack theauthority and legitimacy needed to maintain their control or transform themselvesinto effective governance bodies (Clapham, 2017). Some argue that the externalfunding channeled into Somalia for state-building has had the unintendedconsequence of incentivising and entrenching clan-based militias (Kaplan, 2008).The government institutions and services that do exist are concentrated inMogadishu, with little regional or district-level administrative presence outsidethe capital. After adopting a federal structure in 2004, the state-buildingprocesses of Somalia’s states have further increased the dysfunction of thecentral federal government. Security remains the key challenge, underminingstate-building and service delivery efforts. Somalia’s insecurity, lawlessness, andthe government’s lack of control over the country’s territory makes it vulnerableto terrorism and other illegal activities, including smuggling and piracy.What is clear from the divergent outcomes of peacebuilding and statebuilding in Somaliland and Somalia is that, to achieve local legitimacy andmaintain peace and stability, these approaches must be locally-owned,preferably locally-funded, and should incorporate traditional political structuresand processes, as done in Somaliland. The repeated externally-driven andfunded attempts to impose a Western-style centralised government on Somaliahave not yielded peace, stability, or local legitimacy.12State fragility in Somaliland and Somalia: A contrast in peace and state building

Politicalcompromiseand conflict:Undermining stateeffectiveness4The challenges of state legitimacy and security and conflict in both Somalilandand Somalia have important implications for state effectiveness in these states.Somaliland: Elite capture of the publicsectorSomaliland’s government has been deeply shaped by its political settlement,which was the outcome of negotiations between business elites and politicalleaders. Government institutions are generally operational but fragile, sufferingfrom a lack of technical, political, and financial capacity to implement relevantlaws. Government has succeeded in providing peace and security, but basicservice delivery beyond this is very limited.Some notable institution building has taken place, although many institutionsremain relatively weak. For example, the National Electoral Commission is oneof the more competent institutions in the country, and is viewed as operatinginclusively and transparently (Kaplan, 2008). A civil service commission has beenestablished to train civil servants and improve the capability and professionalismof the civil service sector. However, clan leaders continue to hold considerablepolitical power, which impedes modernisation of Somaliland’s governmentinstitutions and the establishment of a more meritocratic civil service (Kaplan,2008). There also appears to be some incidence of government institutions beingmisused for personal financial and political gains, and government lacks thecapacity and political will needed to address corruption.The Somaliland government’s two main sources of revenue are tax and13State fragility in Somaliland and Somalia: A contrast in peace and state building

indirect development assistance. Without international recognition, Somalilandcannot receive official development assistance or concessional loans frommultilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF). Although difficult, this situation has ensured a high degreeof accountability as taxation is the primary source of government revenues.However, at 7 percent of GDP (2012 estimate), tax revenues are very limited andconsiderably below the sub-Saharan Africa average of 18 percent (World Bank,2014).Business elites are too powerful vis-à-vis the government for proper regulationor taxation, and attempts by government to adopt or enforce taxation lawsare vociferously resisted by elites owning large firms. Even if firms paid tax,government lacks the capacity needed to audit them to verify accuracy of taxpayments. Dominance by business elites in this manner undermines government’srevenue collection potential. Due to larger firms being non-cooperative withtaxation, tax revenues are derived mainly from small and medium enterprises thatlack the elite influence of larger firms. Harassment and probable over-taxation ofsmaller firms (in proportion to their contribution to the national economy) hampersfirm growth and job creation, and limits formalisation and expansion of industry.As a result of the difficulties of collecting income tax and constrained capacityto collect other taxes categorised as inland tax, such as property tax and businesslicense fees, only 16 percent of revenue comes from inland tax sources, while68 percent of revenues comes from customs taxes and fees (Ahmed, 2018).The sizeable share of customs taxes and fees in total government revenues ischaracteristic of low capacity contexts, where it is often easier for government touse their limited capacity to collect revenues at demarcated border points thanin the economy at large. Service industries, such as telecommunications andfinancial services, which make up a notable share of Somaliland’s GDP, tend toimport and export few goods and therefore incur minimal customs taxes and feesin addition to being able to circumvent inland tax collection. Instead, revenues thatare paid to government by large firms are made on a voluntary basis, likely at levelsbelow what they would be paying if taxes and fees were effectively enforced in atransparent and uniform manner.Low levels of tax revenue starve the government of the financial resourcesneeded to strengthen government institutions and to fund basic service provision.Maintaining security comes with a high price tag – some 31 percent of governmentexpenditure is spent on the security sector, leaving little funding available forprovision of other services (Ahmed, 2018). As a result, almost all other servicedelivery is privatised including water, sanitation, education, health, and electricity.Similarly, many justice and law and order services, including contract enforcement,protection of property rights, and dispute resolution, are provided privately, basedon traditional clan customs (World Bank, 2016).Delivery of these services by the private sector, often by companies that facelittle competition, results in Somalilanders having to contend with higher costsand/or lower quality of services and few (if any) alternative providers if they aredissatisfied. Firms’ vested interests in service provision may also motivate them toundermine government’s ability to deliver basic services, including by not payingtax revenues to the government. It is apparent that reform of the taxation systemwill require considerable political commitment from the government, which willface strong backlash from business elites.14State fragility in Somaliland and Somalia: A contrast in peace and state building

Somalia: No functioning central governmentSomalia’s central government has been largely non-functional since 1991.Government institutions are weak and fragile, and the government lacks thefinancial resources to even pay civil servant salaries, let alone build governmentinstitutions. As in Somaliland, basic services are provided by the private sector.Unlike in Somaliland, however, the government has failed to achieve and maintainpeace and security within the country’s borders. Indeed, al-Shabaab, the mainIslamist militant group active in Somalia, managed to expand their territorialcontrol relatively rapidly at least partly because it was able to supply a measureof law and order in the areas under its control, which was appealing to Somalicommunities after years of chaos (Kaplan, 2008). Where pockets of local-levelpolitical s

traditionally nomadic pastoralist society and fierce independence (Kaplan, 2008). In the absence of a central government, social behaviour has been governed by societal institutions, the politics of clannism and kinship, and customary norms and values (de Waal, 2015; Kaplan, 2008). This societal structure relies heavily on