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The history and challenges of Latin American development11IntroductionJosé Antonio Ocampo*The fiftieth anniversary of the Latin American and Caribbean Institute forEconomic and Social Planning (ILPES) is a source of immense pride. Forhalf a century, ILPES has helped to train ranks of professionals in the regionin different spheres of public policy and management, and has providedresearch in planning, public finances and regional development. Through itscurrent Chief, Jorge Máttar, I would like to commend all the chiefs and staffmembers who have played a part in 50 successful years of this honourablebranch of our beloved Economic Commission for Latin America and theCaribbean (ECLAC).This is a good occasion to examine the history of Latin Americadevelopment and, on that basis, reflect upon the challenges and options thatlie before the region. Taking as a starting point the considerations containedin a recent economic history of Latin America written with Luis Bértola, The*Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs and fellow of the Committeeon Global Thought at Columbia University. Formerly United Nations Under-SecretaryGeneral for Economic and Social Affairs; Executive Secretary of the EconomicCommission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); and Minister of Finance andPublic Credit of Colombia. This is a written version of a lecture given by the author atthe commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of ILPES. Therefore, it does not adhere toacademic format and contains no bibliographical references.

12Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)Economic Development of Latin America since Independence,1 I will offer a fewreflections on the current situation and what it tells us about the world thatawaits us, and set forth some brief conclusions about the Latin Americandevelopment agenda.1This book was published in 2012 by Oxford University Press (in English) and will bepublished in Spanish in 2013 by Fondo de Cultura Económica. The Ibero-AmericanSecretariat (SEGIB) published an earlier version in 2010 under the title Desarrollo,vaivenes y desigualdad: Una historia económica de América Latina desde la independencia.The first section draws heavily on the analysis contained in that book, especially fromchapter 6.

The history and challenges of Latin American development13A. The historical legacyA brief look at long-term trends in Latin America shows that the regionmade its greatest strides in economic development during the period of Stateled industrialization.2 This is reflected in figure 1, which shows economicgrowth in moving averages for particular decades. The annual growth ratesof over 5% and 6% posted towards the end of the period had been achievedonly fleetingly during the previous development phase, in which growthwas driven by commodity exports, especially in the decade before theFirst World War and in the 1920s. Conversely, growth rates following theeconomic reforms, which were implemented precisely to hasten economicgrowth, have been much lower, at barely 4% per year over the past decade.Per capita GDP growth was reduced during the State-led industrializationperiod by explosive population growth, but benefited from more recentpopulation trends, thanks to the demographic dividend (i.e., the fall independency rates).2We prefer this term to “import substitution industrialization”, which captures only one—and not necessarily the most important— element of this period of development. Inthe ECLAC terminology, State-led industrialization has also been termed “developmentfrom within”.

14Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)Figure 1LATIN AMERICA: 10-YEAR ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES, 1900-2010(Annual percentage growth rates, based on moving 10-year averagesending in the year indicated in the graph)7654321Series 1Series 95019451940193519301925192019151910190519000Series 3Source: Luis Bértola and José Antonio Ocampo, El desarrollo económico de América Latina desde laindependencia, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2013, in press.Note: Series 1 includes Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba,Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay; the first two observations do not include Cuba or Ecuador. Series 2includes all the countries except the Dominican Republic, Panama, Paraguay and the Plurinational State ofBolivia. Series 3 includes all the countries except Cuba.During the phase of commodity-export-led growth, Latin Americawas —along with central and southern Europe— one of the regions on theperiphery of the world economy that was most successful in joining in thewave of economic growth, which enabled it to become part of a sort of global“middle class”. As a result, between 1870 and 1929, Latin America’s share inglobal GDP rose from 2.6% to 5.2% and the region’s per capita growth ratetopped the world average.3 During the period of State-led industrialization,the Latin American economy continued to grow at above-average rates and toexpand its share of world production, which rose to 9.5% by 1980. Nonetheless,during neither of these periods did it make any significant progress inclosing the gap that was already separating it from the developed world in1870, and, during the industrialized countries’ “golden age” (1950-1973), itfell behind Western Europe. During the last decade of the 1980s, the region’sshare in global GDP fell back to 8.0% and it has continued to slip graduallyever since.3See table 1.1 in Bértola and Ocampo (2013).

The history and challenges of Latin American development15The most recent development period has thus brought a decline, thistime in relation to the world average and, especially, to developing Asia.Since the first and third of these stages coincided with modern globalizationprocesses, Latin America was evidently a winner during the first wave ofglobalization but was unable to take advantage of the second, despite itsrelatively good export performance, ability to attract capital and the factthat major firms in the region (those known as trans-Latins) have performedsuccessfully in the region and beyond.Development progressed unequally within the region, particularlyduring the commodity-export-led development period. By the First WorldWar, the countries of the Southern Cone and, to a lesser extent, Cuba, hadincreased their edge over the rest of the region. From that point on, therewas a tendency toward convergence in regional development levels, partlybecause the leaders began to fall back and partly because other countriesbecame more successful. The latter case was true especially for the two largestcountries (Brazil and Mexico) but also of a few medium-sized countries(Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Colombia) and small ones (CostaRica, Ecuador and Panama, in particular). Nevertheless, there were a fewcountries (Nicaragua and Plurinational State of Bolivia, in particular) thatwere left behind. This process of regional convergence came to a halt duringthe lost decade of the 1980s, however, and in more recent decades has givenway to a growing divergence once again.The economic growth of certain countries shows another strong pattern:the Latin American countries tend to grow rapidly for extended periodsof time during which they narrow the income gap separating them fromindustrialized countries, but these growth spurts then give way to —alsolengthy— periods during which this gap widens again. This process canbe described as one of truncated convergence. Cuba is perhaps the first andmost prominent example: after having been one the leading export successstories in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, its per capitaincome flattened out almost completely from around 1915 onwards. Muchthe same thing occurred in the Southern Cone, which surged ahead untilthe First World War but then lost ground. This was particularly the case inArgentina, which was one of the greatest development success stories duringthe first wave of globalization. Following in its footsteps was Venezuela,which was Latin America’s star performer from the 1920s to the 1960s, thanksto its oil boom and its ability to spread the benefits reaped from that boom,although this period was followed by a relative decline. Brazil and Mexico,the prime success stories of the period of State-led industrialization, followedthis same path soon after.In the absence of “growth miracles”, but also of major crises,Colombia seems to have found the key to maintaining a slow but steadydevelopment path.

16Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)All this has been associated with the Latin American economies’great external vulnerability and the resulting volatility of economic growth.The overriding factor throughout the region’s economic history has beendependency on commodities, whose prices have been highly volatile andespecially so during the First World War, the Great Depression and since themid-1970s. This situation has been compounded by the even greater volatilityassociated with the countries’ highly irregular and procyclical access toexternal financing, which has been at the root of some of the region’s mostextreme business cycles: the boom of the second half of the 1920s, which wasfollowed by the deep downturn and the defaults of almost all the debtorcountries in the 1930s; the boom of the second half of the 1970s, which gaveway to the lost decade of the 1980s; the economic surge of 1991-1997, whichwas cut short when external financing dried up after the Asian crisis of1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998, whose effects lasted half a decade; andthe boom which preceded the global financial crisis of 2008 and the sharpcontraction that followed, although this time it was much shorter, as externalfinancing began to pick up again in mid-2009.One of the features of the region’s external vulnerability was its sharplyvolatile economic growth during the phase of market reforms. This is clearwhen we compare the unstable growth rates for the period 1990-2011 withthose 1950-1980 (see table 1). The greater volatility reflects fluctuations inexternal financing and the terms of trade generated by commodity price cycles,and by the procyclical tendency of macroeconomic policy, which has onlyrecently begun to be reverted, and then only partially. One of the outcomes ofthis is that although some progress has been made towards achieving pricestability and avoiding financial crises, less has been achieved in another areaof macroeconomic stability, one which is in fact often overlooked when theterm is used: stability of economic growth rates.Table 1LATIN AMERICA: GDP GROWTH AND VOLATILITY, 1950-1980 AND hStandarddeviationCoefficientof ple e: Prepared by the author, on the basis of figures provided by the Economic Commission for LatinAmerica and the Caribbean (ECLAC).aDoes not include Cuba.

The history and challenges of Latin American development17Much of what has been discussed here makes it clear that the “BlackLegend” about the period of State-led industrialization is not founded upona careful observation of history. This stage of development was not onlyone of prolonged, rapid and stable growth, but also a time, as we will see,of social progress. It was even, at least since the 1960s (and before, in thecase of the smaller economies), a stage of export growth and diversification,when the classic model of development from within gave way to a mixedmodel that combined import substitution with export promotion andregional integration. It would be an illusion, however, to think that that theregion could return to a development pattern typical of this period, whoseorigins were linked to the collapse of the first wave of globalization morethan anything else. The idea would therefore be anachronistic during thesecond wave of globalization that we are experiencing today.The model had flaws, as well, with the main one being its inabilityto build a solid technological base. That inability was deeply entrenched,as it was rooted in the lag in industrial development that occurred duringthe first wave of globalization, cumulative lags in education and the evengreater backwardness of the region in terms of the construction of a scientifictechnological base of its own. Starting in the mid-1970s, this problem wascompounded by the reversal of the industrialization process when the regionwas still at an early stage in its development. This turnaround was associatedwith the slowing of the upward trend in productivity levels which most ofthe Latin American economies had experienced hitherto.Contrary to market reformers’ expectations, although Latin Americaincreased its integration into the world economy (and, in many ways, successfullyso), this coincided with a downturn in productivity that began during the lostdecade and continued until the first half of the 2000s. This situation did not stopleading enterprises from making strong productivity gains, leading to the increasingdegree of dualism or structural heterogeneity that came to characterize the firstphase of the reform effort, with world-class companies (including the transnationalsoperating in the region and a number of trans-Latins) existing alongside agrowing mass of small businesses and various forms of informal employment.Consequently, the adverse trend in total factor productivity did not begin to recedeuntil the boom of 2003-2007, when informal employment indicators began tofall steadily.Until the early 1970s, a tendency towards high inflation was absent exceptin the Southern Cone and Brazil, and most countries did not exhibit a lack offiscal discipline until the second half of that decade, when large flows of externalfinancing began to pour into the region. Thus, runaway inflation was more an effectthan a cause of the external debt crisis. The inroads made in these two areas areattributable, of course, to the countries’ successful management of macroeconomicvariables during the last two decades. This situation represents a significant and

18Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)unprecedented achievement for Brazil and the countries of the Southern Cone anda return to what had been the normal state of affairs up to the 1960s for the rest ofthe countries.Social progress was slower in coming. The lamentable state of educationin the early twentieth century, even in countries at the forefront of theregion’s development drive, attests to this. Human development indicatorsbegan to improve about a third of the way into the twentieth century,with the biggest advances being registered throughout most of the regionduring the era of State-led industrialization. Progress, as reflected in theseindicators relative to those of the industrialized world, stalled during thelast two decades of the century, although advances continued to be madein education. Steady progress in narrowing the human development gapbetween the region and developed countries resumed in the first decade of thetwenty-first century.The few available studies on poverty reduction indicate that, in thetwentieth century, the greatest progress was also made during the period ofState-led industrialization. Starting in 1980, however, this favourable trendwas followed, not by a “lost decade”, but by an entire “lost quarter-century” interms of poverty reduction. One of the most remarkable developments in recenttimes has been the sharp reduction in poverty achieved in 2003-2008, whichwas coupled with an improvement in income distribution in many countries.The historical trends in income distribution and inequality in the regionare complex and highly variable, and they do not follow any one pattern. Thecolonial legacy of highly segmented economic and social structures continues,of course, to weigh upon the region’s societies, but the impact of that legacyhas been influenced by other factors that have had varying effects on differentcountries in the region. The factors that had the most widespread adverseeffects on distribution were an outgrowth of the first wave of globalization,the 1980s debt crisis and the economic liberalization effort of the late twentiethcentury. For countries that had large labour surpluses (essentially all of themapart from the nations of the Southern Cone), the pressure that those surplusesgenerated during much of the twentieth century also had negative effects interms of distribution. The situation was further compounded by the adverseimpact of a long list of military dictatorships.Positive forces have also been at work, however. In the final analysis, thegreatest steps forward in terms of the promotion of social equality were clearlythe abolition of slavery, which was a long time in coming in some countries(Brazil and Cuba), and the lengthier process of erosion of the various forms ofrural servitude which were quite prevalent even in the early twentieth centuryin most Latin American countries and continued to exert an influence for farlonger. The urbanization process did a great deal to open up new opportunitiesfor people who had been subject to the strict social segmentation characteristic

The history and challenges of Latin American development19of the region’s rural areas. Advances in education, which were also a long timein coming, helped to create a more level playing field and were arguably themain driving force behind the improvement in income distribution seen inthe early twenty-first century. There is still a great deal of ground to cover inthis respect, however, as is demonstrated by the shortcomings and inequalitiescharacteristic of the quality of education currently available to the vast majorityof Latin Americans. The massive influx of European migrants who headedfor the Southern Cone had positive long-term distributional effects. One ofthe reasons for this was that these immigrants brought with them skills,knowledge and especially institutions (including trade unions) that helpedto spread the benefits of development. Other countries in the region have alsomade institutional changes that ushered in greater equity, such as those broughtabout in Costa Rica in the mid-twentieth century and in Cuba in the wake ofits revolution.These varying forces converged in different ways from one countryto the next, an

12 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) Economic Development of Latin America since Independence,1 I will offer a few reflections on the current situation and what it tells us about the world that awaits us, and set forth some brief conclusions about the Latin American development agenda. 1 .