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these goals; and(d) the technical means used convey said messages.(Schleifer, 2009, p. 222-223).These points could be appropriate when analyzing psychological warfare butdo not provide the defined target group that can be seen as useful when locatingthe specific means of a PSYOP campaign. Robert L. Perry gives a valid criticto this type of analytical framework used by Schleifer in previous work. Thecritic presented claims that Schleifer's work is not sufficiently organized andhave a lacking in logic. Perry states that the need for a precise definition andoperational structures being vital for the discussion of psychological warfare(Perry & Schleifer, 2008, p. 137-138).Using the U.S. army guidelines in PSYOP research has evolved over time butthe manuals are still extensive work to regard when theorizing. In 2005 thefollowing points were considered to guide the PSYOP campaigns in bothviolent and nonviolent situations to “hasten the eventual defeat of enemyforces” (US. Army, 2005, p. 24). This being operational and tactical levels ofthe objective. Undermining the will of the enemy to resist. Increasing unrest among the civilian population in enemy areas. Increasing desertion or surrender of enemy forces. Reducing civilian interference with military operations. Undermining the credibility of enemy leadership. Reducing damage to elements of infrastructure critical to end-stateobjectives. Increasing acceptance of friendly forces in occupied territory. Deterring intervention of neutral and neighboring powers. Countering propaganda.(U.S. Army, 2005, p. 24).9 (46)

These points are a defined map of how the analytical work should beconducted by the U.S. Army, that which makes the analytical framework to betoo defined and adjusted specifically for the U.S. Army, making theapplication complicated.2.2 Definition of Psychological WarfarePaul Linebarger discusses in his book “Psychological Warfare” (2015) thedefinition of psychological warfare. Psychological warfare is described as acontinuous process in which seeks to win military gains without the usage ofmilitary force. Psychological warfare can be overt or covert in its mission.Linebarger defines psychological warfare as:“Psychological warfare comprises the use of propaganda against anenemy, together with such other operational measures of a military,economic, or political nature as may be required to supplementpropaganda.” (Paul Linebarger. 2015, p. 58).Here focusing on the term propaganda as the big player in psychologicalwarfare (Linebarger, 2015, p. 58). Propaganda does not include the plannedoperations not played out as the traditional communication platforms for themass (Linebarger, 2015, ch. 3). Moving away from this to focus more onpsychological warfare as a method to pinpoint the essence of PSYOP’s,propaganda is not included in the following.Psychological warfare is an essential part of modern warfare and is conductedin the area between civil society and the battlefield (Ottosen, 2013, p. 73).Psychological warfare as a method has done a journey from having the aim oflowering enemy morale to benefit military objectives and using it as a "softpower" tool, influencing and not coercing. Then shifting on to the more wellknown traditional types of psychological warfare of affecting the enemysoldiers, enemy civilians and then moving on to the enemy governments anddecisionmakers (Mansdorf, 2015, p. 649-650). In all PSYOP campaigns, it is10 (46)

necessary to clarify and identify the opponent's fundamental levers so there isa clear target for the neutralization, and for the PSYOP to affect their will forhostilities (Schleifer, 2009, p. 227). Irwin J. Mansdorf (2015) describes therising need for relating aspects traditionally more used in "Public diplomacy".Here focusing on terms like "informing and influencing foreign publics",aiming at other groups, not just enemies. Mansdorf, however, claims thatpsychological warfare has necessary scientifically and researched techniquesof procedures. Here arguing that psychological warfare is based on rationaldetermination and evidence-based logic, drawing more on scientific logic,than acting on personal opinion and individual perception (Mansdorf, 2015, p.649-650).Psychological warfare, is according to Mansdorf defined in the most elaborateand detailed way as:“Planned operations that convey selected information and indicators toforeign target audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments,organizations, groups, and individuals.” (Irwin J. Mansdorf 2015, p.659).2.3 Contemporary researchThe means of delivery for the information of persuasion have historically been,mass media, paper leaflets, radio, and newspapers. Today the process ofinfluence is more adapted to new technology and PSYOP uses social mediachannels and email along with other social networks to get the message across(Schleifer, 2014, p. 155). Kuntsman & Stein explains this as a form of digitalmilitarism. Digital militarism is a phenomenon that aims to describe theprocess in military power that the digital platforms and social media have. Theincreasing use of digital tools came with the twenty-first century'stechnological increase and development. Media have become a tool for11 (46)

military advancement both for the state and for nonstate actors. This draws onaspects to influence the minds and actions of others by channels likeInstagram, Facebook, and YouTube. Today the militarization and influencefrom actors like the Israeli state additionally using surveillance and havingcounterinsurgency in the toolbox (Kuntsman & Stein, 2015, p. 6-7).3. Israel’s previous Psychological WarfareIsrael is a well-known user of psychological warfare campaigns and forhistorical context, the use of psychological warfare in the Second Intifada2000-2005 and the Lebanon war of 2006 will be presented. This to give thenecessary background that acts as the historical base of the psychologicalwarfare used by Israel.3.1 Second Intifada 2000-2005The PSYOP used by Israel during the Second Intifada took different paths butmedia presence was what permeated. The target for the media campaigns wasmerely to paint the picture of brutal terrorists, the Arabs. Israel put a massiveeffort in creating the image of the enlightened people of Israel and the horribleArabs. Israeli media focused on broadcasting pictures of the suffering made tothe soldiers and population in Israel while holding back broadcasts of thesuffering made to the Arabs. This to influence the general public, foreignactors, the Arabs, and the Israeli citizens. Palestine answered by projecting theopposite appearance of the Palestinians being the suffering people and theIsraeli to be the horrible oppressor (Wolsfeld, 2003, p. 1-5). Israel startedunder the Second Intifada (2000-2005) developing PSYOP techniques moreextensively and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) coined in connection toPSYOP the aspect of: "burning into the enemy’s consciousness” (Schleifer,2014, p. 154).12 (46)

3.2 Lebanon war 2006Ryan Schleifer (2009) writes about the psychological warfare campaign onHezbollah from Israel during the Lebanon war 2006, using Lasswell's modelof communication: who says what to whom, in which channel and to whateffect. This along with U.S. Army PSYOP field manuals. Israel's use ofPSYOP’s has increased over time but the major shift in practice started in thelate 1990s when the repercussion of targeting the minds and using persuasionwas raised as powerful in war and conflict for Israel. The Lebanon war in 2006came inconveniently as Israel was recovering from the ongoing conflict inGaza and the Second Intifada. This affecting the strength of Israel in variousaspects such as military and politically but also psychological (Schleifer, 2009,p. 223-226). The Lebanon war in 2006 lasted 34 days and the IDF was poorlyprepared for Hezbollah. This failure of a war for Israel increased the IDFintelligence gathering and they now needed to improve their knowledge toprevent this from happening again (Harel, 2016). Hezbollah further carried outa verbal smear campaign against Israeli soldiers creating an impression thatthe capabilities of IDF were limited. This along with many other factorsleading to the targeting of Hezbollah and especially its leader Nasrallah. Israelalso focused the PSYOP campaigns on its opponents, supporters and theLebanon general public for the campaign to be as immense as possible(Schleifer, 2009, p. 223-226).Kuntsman & Stein defines Israel’s different ways of exploring the increase indigital militarisation, that in both the private spheres of the individualsworking within the IDF and the more public influence such as Twitter whichis frequently used to publicly spread information (Kuntsman & Stein, 2015, p.20-22). Benjamin Netanyahu the Israeli prime minister is also a bigcontributor, his speeches and social media presence is large and considerable.Together with Israel's media outlets, the transmission of information andimages published per effect both the Israeli people but also their opponents13 (46)

(Kuntsman & Stein, 2015, p. 9-10). Schleifer's (2009) analysis regarding thissuggests two main objectives. The first one being a military-oriented goalsecuring the northern parts of Israel. The second being to a more politicalextent, to insecure and threaten Hezbollah's position in Lebanon. In the aim ofthe political aspect, Israel focused on undermining Nasrallah’s position withinHezbollah, driving a wedge between the Lebanon Shi'ite community and theHezbollah, weakening Hezbollah. To impair a leader is a difficult undertakingwith the potential exposure of backfire and increasing the enemy leaders'support. In 2006 Israel launched a massive PSYOP campaign against theHezbollah leader Nasrallah intending to sabotage the prominent structure ofHezbollah. Here drawing on humor as the collector of the gathering of criticalthinking, creating amusement concerning the leader to establish a way in,affecting the minds. Affecting people's opinions and constructing Nasrallah asHezbollah, personalizing the message and connecting everything Hezbollahdoes as Nasrallah as a person (Schleifer, 2009, p. 227-230).Israel in its determination to cover messages, realized the popularity inLebanon concerning a radio broadcaster mixing the content with bothinformation and attractive music entertainment, to reach a broader audience.Israel in response to this began to broadcast specific details to specific areas todraw more listeners, but ultimately due to bad cover of identity ended uprevealing its plan regarding Hezbollah. Israel has since tried to enhance itsconveys in messages and have turned to other ways of influence. Israel set upa website luring Lebanese people presuming it was Israel opposers publishing,calling for people to report the location of Hezbollah's military positions, thewebsite was soon closed by Hezbollah hackers (Schleifer, 2009, p. 227-230).The PSYOP campaigns changed throughout to target the Lebanesegovernment at times but the focus on Hezbollah and Nasrallah proved to bemore effective in constructing the population to blame the struggles of theirlives on Nasrallah (Schleifer, 2009, p. 227-230).14 (46)

The determination to drive a wedge between groups is a big part of the PSYOP(Linebarger, 2015, ch. 1). That in which Israel has pushed extensively.Spreading information about organizations following its agenda and notLebanon's. For example, dropping a massive amount of air fresheners withNasrallah being hidden behind a tree, constructing many different politicalpoints but with the general message of Nasrallah being a coward hiding behindthe Lebanese people, making a point of the people acting as bait. Israel hasalso been working extensively to undermine credibility highlighting its flawsand creating confusion (Schleifer, 2009, p. 228-230).There has been a move towards more nonviolence within psychologicalwarfare. The goal is to use both the more traditional PSYOP techniques but toalso heighten the nonviolence aspect with victim-blaming. Mansdorf (2015)claims the “west” has more of the approach that the victim is morally alwaysright. This being tarnished and not acting as considered in the middle easternnorms. There is a refusing of accountability and victim responsibility is but inthe back end of things. Irwin J. Mansdorf (2015) states that: "Violence, evenextreme and brutal violence, is psychologically excused by claimingasymmetry between the alleged victim and the accused oppressor." (Mansdorf,2015, p. 657).Schleifer argues that Israel's PSYOP campaigns in 2006 against Hezbollah,failed. Hezbollah did not repress their military forces against Israel and thewar ended with Hezbollah continuously having control and the neighboringsupport from Iran and Syria only cultivating. This showing on the failure ofthe PSYOP campaigns (Schleifer, 2009).Yagil Levy states complementary that the war was a failure, in trying to disarmand deteriorate Hezbollah, Israel put its personnel through unnecessary risk,not receiving any advance (Levy, 2010). Israel did solely manage to createtension and unease between the different minorities supporting Hezbollah.Directing the light on Nasrallah and his flaws the PSYOP helped fuel the15 (46)

feelings already existing to some extent (Schleifer, 2009). The civil public ofLebanon was still greatly affected by the war and the support for Hezbollahwas mildly affected.4. Theoretical frameworkThe foundation of this theoretical framework is based on Libicki (1995) witha theoretical development collecting work from Schleifer (2009), Mansdorf(2015), and Linebarger (2015). The theoretical development is additionallybased on previous patterns of PSYOP from Israel. Psychological warfare isdefined by Libicki as the use of information against the human mind andLibicki prefers to categorize it in four categories:1, Operations against the national will2, Operations against opposing commanders,3, Operations against troops,4, Operations of cultural conflict(Libicki, 1995, ch. 6).In connection to Libicki’s theoretical framework a development of numberfour, cultural conflict, is presented. Incorporating Libicki’s cultural conflictwith an aspect of ideology, to broaden and specify the theory to potentiallyhinder a disregard of aspects in PSYOP that could conceivably act as valuable.The work from Schleifer and Linebarger along with previous research is thefoundational contributor for the theoretical development. Presented below isalso a suggestion for a theoretical addition on a fifth category, this for a moredefined and inclusive description of psychological warfare: 5, Politicalleaders. This addition is based on Israel’s historical use of PSYOP andincluded in an aspiration to encompass as many aspects of Israel’spsychological warfare as possible. Here the work of Mansdorf and Schleifer isadditionally used.16 (46)

4.1 Counter-willOperations against the national will are presented as either "accept us asfriendly" or as the "or else" approach. With an element of either a friendlyinvitation or a threat of violence or harming consequences. International mediaare powerful in the influence of systematic sharpening of the informationutilized in war. This is psychological warfare towards the state or groupaltogether using known media as a tool. Here emanating a message, for thento be acquired by known media (Libicki, 1995, p. 35-39). What “national will”really is can be debated but Kubiak (2014) defines it with the U.S. as anexample, as: “national will in war is the political sustainability of a U.S. policythat seeks to satisfy foreign policy objectives predominantly through the useof military force” (Kubiak, 2014, p. 2). Targeting the counter-will the aim isto create distrust in the organization as a whole, causing them to adopt. Byinserting political instability the psychological warfare takes place. Libickiuses an example of when this variety was utilized, the broadcast of dead U.S.soldiers being dragged in Somalia made the U.S. forces to withdraw makingthe opposing benefit and successfully influencing. Imposing on the nationalwill to direct the outcome to be beneficial (Libicki, 1995, p. 35-39).4.2 CounterforcesOperations against opposing troops are the use of psychological methods ininfluencing the counterforces here named as Hezbollah members. That can bepresented as the fear of death or other loss and the possible creation ofresentment between the ground soldiers and the people in command. Usingtechnology as a means to speak to the other side, giving informat

psychological warfare that would if unnoticed give an insufficient analysis and description of the psychological warfare for this case. The research uses theory application to generate the conclusion and to describe the PSYOP. The result of this work shows the extensive