Lessons Learned From Process Safety Management A Practical .

Transcription

Lessons learned from Process SafetyManagementA Practical Guide to Defense in DepthNEAL LANGERMANAdvanced Chemical SafetySan Diego, California, USA

Defense in depthLAYER OF PROTECTIONAlfred NobelTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depthChicago Pile 1Three Levels of control (protection)Enrico Fermi1. Manual control rod2. Motor-driven control rod – activatedby neutron activity3. Gravity driven control rod, activatedby man with axeTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depth Layers of Protection Defense in Depth Every defense has weaknesses Chemical enterprise learned from failures Share some lessons learned with the Nuclear PowerenterpriseTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depth PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT A guide to defense in depth Applicability – Basic chemical engineering principals Regulatory, but broad applicability US OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119Topical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depth Technical sections of 1910.119 Layers of Protection Process Hazard Analysis Process Safety Analysis Management of Change Emergency PreparednessTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depth Principles of PSM Process Safety InformationProcess Hazard AnalysisOperating ProceduresEmployee TrainingContractorsPre-Startup Safety ReviewTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depth Principles of PSM (continued) Mechanical Integrity of EquipmentNon-routine Work AuthorizationsManaging ChangeIncident InvestigationEmergency PreparednessCompliance Audits Lessons learned from a failureTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depth T2 CHEMICAL PLANT FAILURETopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depth T2 Failures Mechanical Integrity Management of Change Process Hazard Analysis Emergency Preparedness Failure to maintain LOP leads to disasterTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depth Process Safety Management Applicable to any industrial activity Scalable Flexible Well-documented Defense in Depth, INSAG-10 can be extended to includethe PSM principlesTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depthCOMPARISON OF DiD AND PSMIAEA DEFENSE IN DEPTHDeterministic designUS OSHA PROCESS SAFETYMANAGEMENTProcess Safety InformationProcess Hazard AnalysisOperating ProceduresPre-Startup Safety ReviewMechanical Integrity of EquipmentTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depthProbabilistic studies and defense in Process Safety InformationdepthProcess Hazard AnalysisOperating ProceduresEmployee TrainingMeans of achieving operationalsafetyOperating ProceduresEmployee TrainingContractorsPre-Startup Safety ReviewMechanical Integrity of EquipmentNon-routine Work AuthorizationsManaging ChangeTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depthEnhancement of safetyProcess Safety InformationProcess Hazard AnalysisOperating ProceduresEmployee TrainingContractorsPre-Startup Safety ReviewMechanical Integrity of EquipmentNon-routine Work AuthorizationsManaging ChangeIncident InvestigationEmergency PreparednessCompliance AuditsTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depthAccident controlEmergency PreparednessManagement of severe accidentsEmergency PreparednessEmergency responseIncident InvestigationEmergency PreparednessSafety assessment and verificationof defense in depthCompliance AuditsThe regulatory bodyCompliance AuditsTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depthInternational peer review processes Process Safety InformationProcess Hazard AnalysisOperating ProceduresEmployee TrainingContractorsPre-Startup Safety ReviewMechanical Integrity of EquipmentNon-routine Work AuthorizationsManaging ChangeIncident InvestigationEmergency PreparednessCompliance AuditsTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depth Management of change (word modified for reactoroperators) 1910.119(l) The reactor operator shall establish and implementwritten procedures to manage changes (except for"replacements in kind") to process chemicals,technology, equipment, and procedures; and, changesto facilities that affect a process.Topical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depthThe procedures shall assure that the followingconsiderations are addressed prior to any change:The technical basis for the proposed change;Impact of change on safety and health;Modifications to operating procedures;Necessary time period for the change; and,Authorization requirements for the proposed change.Particularly applicable to research reactors, where change isfrequentTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depth PSM is enhancing operational safety at US chemicalplants U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board(csb.gov) investigates incidents and relates underlyingcauses to PSM correctable failures PSM principles are applicable to reactors and reactoroperators PSM principles will enhance operational safetyTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depth Recommendations for reactor operators Review operating procedures in terms of PSM Use PSM “lessons learned” to make operatingprocedures more robust Adopt PSM principles as guides for all aspects ofreactor operationsTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depth Resources 29 CFR 1910.119 AIChE Center for Chemical Process Safety library pical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depthKeep your corescontrolled and yourplants safeTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depthTHANK YOUTopical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

Defense in depthQUESTIONS?Topical Issues in NuclearInstallation Safety

US OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety. Defense in depth Technical sections of 1910.119 Layers of Protection Process Hazard Analysis Process Safety Analysis Management of Change Emergency Preparedness Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety . Defense in depth Principles of PSM Process Safety Information Process Hazard .