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following guidance, "If mission and force protection are inconflict, then we don't do the mission."3To us, these two examples from the many communicatedeach week within the media and among the e-mail of theArmy officer corps demonstrate that the Army's norms ofprofessional behavior are being corroded by politicalguidance on force protection. Doubtless the ethics of otherservices are being corroded by the same guidance—witnessAir Force pilots flying combat missions from fifteenthousand feet in Kosovo and Bosnia to avoid the risk of pilotloss from ground fire and missiles. Yet one does not hearsenior military leaders defending the military ethic,informing the profession and the American public it servesof its utter necessity for military effectiveness. Neither doesone read in military journals significant dialogues on thepersonal conflicts this is causing for individual officers.Placed in the larger context and stated simply, changesin the international system since the end of the Cold War,the new nature of conflict (which we will refer to simply asmilitary operations other than war, MOOTW) and secularchanges within American society are strongly influencingthe American military ethic in directions unknown. This isan issue of military professionalism, rightly understood;and as such in an era of already declining Armyprofessionalism is of vital concern to both professionals andthe society they serve.Thus this manuscript will proceed to place this issue intothe context of military professionalism, a topic little studiedin the military now and even less understood outside theprofession. Subsequently, we will use that framework toanalyze two issues within the profession now impedinghealthy adaptations—the officer corps' intellectual muddleover the purpose of the Army and their ethical muddle overthe role of self-sacrifice in the profession's ethos. We believethese two unresolved contradictions have contributed invery significant ways to the Army's inability thus far to dealeffectively with vexing issues such as force protection.

Lastly, we will present a "principled approach" for arenewed self-concept and motivation of the Army officercorps, a self-concept that, if it existed now, would lend a verydifferent perspective to such issues as force protection.A Framework for Analysis:Military Professionalism.Our understanding of military professionalism isadapted from Professor Sam. C. Sarkesian.4 As he noted in1981, "the examination of professionalism, its boundaries,and substantive elements lack a generally accepted andcoherent perspective."5 Fortunately, Professor Sarkesianoutlined such a framework in his book, but to our knowledgeit has not been seen in the literature since. It is a frameworkthat in the more quantitative analytical environment todaywould be considered a 3x3 matrix of political, social andfunctional interactions inherent in the relationshipsbetween a democratic society and its Army—its militaryservants. In matrix form it appears as:ComponentsLevelof AnalysisMilitaryTechnicalSocietyLand mine ban,MOOTWmissionsPost-modern oregoist utionRMA,resources,recruiting, anddecliningprofessionalismTheProfessionalMilitary Ethicand forceprotectionPowell Doctrineand forceprotectionIndividualskills, re 1. American Military Professionalism.

Further, each of these components can be analyzed fromat least three different levels. They can be viewed at thelevel of, or from the perspective of, the American societysanctioning the military institution, the military institutionitself (the Army), or from the perspective of the individualsoldier within the institution. In contrast to the verticallines above, the horizontal lines in the diagram representreal boundaries across which deep and abidingrelationships have been created, both official (formal) andunofficial (informal). These relationships and some of thecontemporary issues creating tensions, both healthy anddysfunctional, will be delineated briefly in the sections thatfollow in order to show their contextual reality among themany interactions and relationships involved. Takentogether they provide a brief overview of the state of themilitary institution, its professionalism or effectiveness,and its relationship with the society it serves.The Functional or Military-Technical Component. Thiscomponent includes those aspects of the profession that giveit unique purpose and legitimacy, what Huntington calledthe "expertise" of the profession.6 He defined this function inthe post-World War II era as the "management of violence."Others have at different times given it different titles, butthe essence remains clear regardless of specific purposestatement: Armies have been created by societies throughthe ages for the purpose of protecting themselves, theirterritory and their way of life, and for advancing theirnational interests in the regions around them. During thealmost four centuries since the Treaty of Westphalia andthe appearance of the nation-state, the formativerelationships between societies and their armies havevaried dramatically depending on the society, its ideologyand its form of government, i.e., the state.7 Now in thepost-Cold War era, it may be the case that once again theformative relationships have changed, at least among theadvanced democratic nations, reserving armies forprimarily defensive purposes.8 Such formativerelationships include the purpose for which society seeks to

prepare and use its army and the resources provided forsuch uses, particularly human resources—by conscriptionof a mass citizen army, by soliciting/enticing volunteersfrom among the citizenry as the United States does today, orby some combination of these methods.At the societal level, one currently contentious issue (asnoted in Figure 1) is the desire of some American politicalleaders and a considerable portion of the public to outlaw byinternational treaty the use of land mines as a form ofwarfare. Such intrusions into the traditional sphere ofmilitary professionals—how best to fight wars—is oneindicator of society's dissatisfaction with currentprofessionalism. Thus the darker horizontal line separatingthe societal level of analysis from the institutional levelconnotes an American civil-military relationship currentlywith significant tensions on many issues across all threecomponents of professionalism, land mines being only one.At the institutional level, the military-technicalcomponent focuses on the overall effectiveness of the Army.Is it capable of doing what society expects of it and in themanner it is expected? Such military effectiveness is theresult of many things, some under the control of the leadersof the military institution and others that must be providedby a supporting society.10 Internally, the U.S. Army todayconsiders these essential inputs to combat effectiveness tobe the "six imperatives": force mix, doctrine, training,modern equipment, leader development, and qualitypeople.11At this level of analysis, there are myriad issuescurrently demanding the urgent attention of the officercorps, those who are responsible for creating the intellectualconsensus and direction that sets the professionalstandards which produce military effectiveness, andsubsequently for policing and adapting these standards asnecessary. Such issues include the institution's inability toobtain a level of resources sufficient to the institution'sneeds, the demonstrable decline in military effectiveness of

front-line operational units,12 and the urgent, but unmet,need to modernize fighting forces for the informationdominant forms of warfare potentially available in the"revolution in military affairs (RMA)."13 These issues, all ofmajor significance for the decline in Army professionalism,have existed roughly in current form since shortly after theend of the Gulf War in 1992.At the third level of analysis, that of the individualsoldier, professionalism in the functional componentbecomes the issue of individual competence in soldier skillsand the motivation by which those skills are to be used andintegrated with those of other soldiers, whether they beofficer, noncommissioned officer or enlisted soldier. Giventhe virtual revolution that occurred in Army trainingprograms in the 1980s, resulting in the remarkableproficiency of our forces in the Gulf War, it might besupposed that at this level few problems exist. But that isclearly not the case. Since the Gulf War, the seriousmismatch between a military structure too large andresources too small, when combined with an unusually highoperational tempo for MOOTW, has severely eroded thetrust and commitment of individual officers and soldierstoward both the Army and the society it serves. This hasbeen particularly so when the soldier's quality of life iscontrasted to a roaring American economy with an excess ofgood job opportunities. Thus at the individual leveldeclining professionalism is reflected in the systemicinstitutional failure to attract and retain sufficient recruitsfrom the citizenry to man the current Army force structure,along with the continuing exodus of company grade officers,particularly from the combat arms.14The Ethical Component. The ethical component seeks ateach level of analysis to answer questions like "what shouldofficers and soldiers do?" and "what kind of leaders shouldthe Army have?" The answers to these questions establishnorms of individual and collective behavior, what courses ofaction, and what outcomes the officer is obligated to seek; insum, they constitute a professional military ethic. We

accept the definition of "ethic" as "the body of moralprinciples or values governing a particular culture orgroup."15 Just as with the military-technical component,this component can be analyzed from the perspectives ofAmerican society, the military institution, or the individualsoldier.At the societal level, it is difficult to categorize succinctlythe ethics to which Americans adhere. Americans are aneclectic people who embrace a variety of ethical beliefs;however, recently some have accumulated more weight asthose in influence have embraced them. These trends, oftenlabeled inaccurately as "post-modernism," reflect arejection by many Americans of traditional moralstandards. While some skepticism regarding tradition andauthority is healthy, completely rejecting traditionalstandards undermines the possibility of a common nationalor societal ethic on which professional organizations canrely to inform their own ethics. What many call "postmodernism" is best thought of as a complex collection ofbeliefs and theories that, in essence, reject the idea thatthere is any such thing as objective truth, ethical orotherwise. Without an objective standard, "truth" is thenleft to the individual or group to decide and thus becomesrelative to their desires and beliefs. This has underminedthe earlier consensus among Americans that any particularbelief can actually be wrong.Of course, not all Americans embrace such relativism,but often what arises in its place is an unreflective egoism,which is best characterized as the belief that what ismorally good is "what is best for me." Rather than therelative standard that post modernism offers, egoism is anobjective standard against which to measure conduct. Itsbasic premise is everyone should do those things, and onlythose things, that they perceive are good for them. Such anethic does not necessitate untrustworthiness, cowardice, orselfishness, and, in fact, many Americans have found that itis in their interests to be trustworthy, brave, and giving, andoften so behave. Nonetheless, such an ethic does not

preclude behavior such as untrustworthiness, cowardice, orselfishness by describing it as morally reprehensible—andwhen it does not, this ethic comes into direct conflict withthe professional military ethic.Many Americans have combined this egoist ethic withthe post-modern insight that all truth is relative, and relyon the contradictory ethical system that results from thisviewpoint to make ethical decisions. We cannot recount thenumber of students we have had who profess a belief inChristianity, Judaism, or Islam but reject the possibility ofobjective moral truth. This experience on campuses hasbeen noted and written about by other philosophers.16 Thefact that the acceptability of such contradictory beliefs hasseeped so profusely through modern religious institutions isalarming evidence that reason is slowly being disregardedas important in the larger society. And to a militaryinstitution that values, and indeed prizes, rational thoughtand decisionmaking processes, the potential conflict isimmense. Just as our students see no problem embracingthe contradictory beliefs of an objective religion along withrelative "post-modernism," so too many officers today seenothing wrong with embracing a personal ethic ofunreflective self-interest or relativism, along with theobjective ethical demands of the profession.At the level of the military institution, this contradictionis most evident as officers attempt to reconcile theirpersonal ethic with that of the institution. While the beliefsof egoism and post-modern relativism can be heldconsistently by many in America, they cannot be held byArmy officers who simultaneously hold an objectiveprofessional ethic.17 One reason is that while theprofessional military ethic requires that at least sometruths be held as objective, the social ethic does not. Anotheris that while the professional military ethic requires thatthe officer put self-interest secondary to at least some otherconsiderations, the prevailing social ethic does not. This isnot a new dilemma for the Army: Since the founding of theRepublic with its unique social contract making the8

citizenry sovereign over the state, the Army has understoodand accepted that it, ironically, can never reflect internallythe essence of this contract.18Furthermore, the ethical obligations of the officer areobjective and are not contingent on any desire held by anyindividual. The professional military ethic is not a relativeethic. The obligation to uphold it or any of its tenets does notarise because those in the profession said so, but ratherbecause it is necessary if the profession is to be effective inits purpose of warfighting. In a relativist ethic what is goodor bad is justified based on the desires of the individual orgroup; what is good is what makes one (or the group) feelgood, while what is bad is what does not. For a professionalethic, good and bad are determined, in part functionally, byhow the profession contributes to society. As noted earlier,the military performs a socially useful, indeed vitalfunction—the protection of society and its territory and wayof life. This creates a moral obligation for the soldier, andparticularly for the commissioned officer, to respondeffectively when called on to defend a defenseless society,even to the point of death.19Thus, where it would be improper for a manager at IBMto invade the privacy of her employees, the officer is morallyobligated to do so. In order for the military to function well,leaders must know and have influence over many aspects ofsoldiers' private lives, including their health and physicalcondition, how they spend their money, and where and withwhom they spend their free time.20 This does not mean,however, that Tightness or wrongness of exercising suchinfluence is relative to the situation, or even relative to thedesires of the officer corps or business professionals. Itmeans that given how the officer and the businessmancontribute to the well-being of society, in every case it wouldbe wrong for the IBM manager to exercise such influenceand right for the military officer to do so.The objectivity of the professional military ethic is alsonot contingent on any personal desire a member of the

profession might have. These obligations are not merelyinstrumental—they do not take the form "If I want to be asoldier, then I must be willing to sacrifice." Rather they takethe form "Since I am a soldier, I must be willing to sacrifice."The source of these truths arise out of the moral obligationan officer incurs when he or she accepts a public trust, i.e.,when an officer accepts freely, without reservation, his orher Commission from society. The obligations may beprofession specific—that is they only hold for those whoaccept the Commission—but they are nonetheless objectivein nature. They hold regardless of the desires or beliefs ofthose who accept such charges.Given this understanding of the nature of theprofessional military ethic, at the individual level theproblem is not just that the contradictions discussed earliermay cause soldiers to mistakenly choose one ethic over theother. Nor is the problem that soldiers may sometimes giveweight to the social ethic when they should have givenweight to the professional ethic though on occasion this toocan be a problem, witness the Aberdeen scandal or theegregious behavior of BG Hale.21The fundamental problem is the existence of thecontradiction itself. Logically, anything can follow from acontradiction. And if literally anything follows from acontradiction, then any system of beliefs that iscontradictory can produce any other belief. Ethical beliefsystems are supposed to guide our behavior. But if anythingfollows from a contradiction then anything could be anethical truth and thus any belief can pass as ethicalguidance. And if any belief can pass as ethical guidance,then ethics would not be able to guide decisions eitherindividually or organizationally—any decision would bejust as good as another! This renders such an ethical systemnonsensical and self-defeating.Some officers claim that their unwillingness to adoptfully the norm of self-sacrifice is motivated more byunwillingness to sacrifice in vain, rather than relativism or10

egoism. They are not, so the argument goes, interested inmaximizing self-interest, but rather the national interest.They see many MOOTW missions as never-ending, quixoticquests that are only marginally in the national interest. Inthis view, putting soldiers' lives at risk when it benefitsAmerica so little is not just imprudent, but immoral. Suchofficers then see radical force protection22 as inherentlymoral since it limits the chances that soldiers might have topay the "ultimate" sacrifice in vain.Certainly, it is wrong for the civilian leadership to putsoldiers' lives in jeopardy for immoral reasons. It is just ascertain that the military's senior leadership is required topoint that out to civilian leaders when they feel the civilianleadership is doing so. What is not clear, though, is thatmissions that do not serve individual perceptions ofnational interests are in fact immoral. It would be hard toargue that intervening to prevent humanitaria

DR. DON M. SNIDER is Professor of Political Science, teaching seminars in military innovation/adaptation and civil-military relations in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. He has been a member of the civilian faculty of the U.S. Military Academy since 1998, having previously held the Olin Chair in National Security Studies, 1995-1998.