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IntroductionThe 2006 version of FM 3-24/ MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, filled an important doctrinal gap at atime when U.S. forces were engaged in counterinsurgency operations. This version ofFM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 builds on that important manual. This field manual provides doctrine that framescounterinsurgency within the context of the range of military operations and provides a framework for thedifferent ways land forces could counter an insurgency. Understanding insurgencies and the operationalenvironment in which they exist, the ways in which the U.S. will attempt to counter insurgencies, and howcommanders synchronize their efforts to achieve end states is at the core of what this manual provides toboth the Army and the Marine Corps.This version is organized differently than the 2006 version. The new title, Insurgencies and CounteringInsurgencies, provides insight into the thinking behind the organization. Overall, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 isdivided into three parts. Part one provides strategic and operational context, part two provides the doctrinefor understanding insurgencies, and part three provides doctrine for defeating an insurgency. In short,FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is organized to provide the context of a problem, the problem, and possiblesolutions.Part one, the “Strategic and Operational Context,” provides a framework for understanding the environmentwhere a counterinsurgency exists. Part one consists of chapters one through three.Part two, “Insurgencies,” provides a doctrinal framework for understanding an insurgency. Part twoconsists of chapters four and five.Part three, “Counterinsurgencies,” describes how to plan and execute operations to enable a host nation todefeat an insurgency.Chapter 1, “Understanding the Strategic Context,” answers the questions of how and why U.S. forces mightget involved in a counterinsurgency. Chapter 1 highlights that there are many different ways U.S. forcescould counter an insurgency and that there are a range of various contexts in which an insurgency canoccur. Commanders and staffs must understand the conditions in which an insurgency occurs and theoverall strategy for countering that insurgency so they can effectively support it.Chapter 2, “Understanding an Operational Environment,” provides context for an operational environmentwhere an insurgency might be occurring.Chapter 3, “Culture,” describes the role of culture in counterinsurgency operations. Understanding cultureis essential in any effort to support a counterinsurgency effort. Culture is of unique importance inunderstanding an operational environment.Chapter 4, “Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals,” provides doctrine for understanding theprerequisites of an insurgency and the root causes that allow an insurgency to keep and gain legitimacy. Itthan provides a framework for understanding the strategic decisions an insurgency might make and eightdynamics for analyzing any particular insurgency.Chapter 5, “Insurgency Threat Characteristics,” provides doctrine for understanding the threatcharacteristics of an insurgency.Chapter 6, “Command and Control and Mission Command,” provides doctrine for executing command andcontrol under the philosophy of mission command. In a counterinsurgency effort, many units may performmany different tasks in decentralized operations. Understanding decentralized operations and ensuringthese units are meeting the overall commander’s intent is essential for successful counterinsurgencyoperations.Chapter 7, “Planning and Operational Considerations,” provides guidance on how commanders and staffscan work from conceptual planning to detailed planning in counterinsurgency operations. It also provides13 May 2014FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5vii

Introductionimportant operational considerations, such as attack the network, that are essential in counterinsurgencyoperations.Chapter 8, “Intelligence,” provides considerations for intelligence in counterinsurgency. Becauseunderstanding the environment is essential in counterinsurgency, intelligence facilities successfuloperations.Chapter 9, “Direct Approaches to Counter an Insurgency,” provides guidance on how the Army and theMarine Corps directly counter an insurgency at the operational and tactical level. The operationalphilosophy behind the direct approach is shape-clear-hold-build-transition. If tactical units are directlyinterfacing with a society, they will perform shape-clear-hold-build-transition. In addition to guiding U.S.forces’ actions, shape-clear-hold-build-transition also provides a framework for understanding host-nationactions. If U.S. forces have to be the primary counterinsurgency force until the host nation can deploy itsforces, shape-clear-hold-build-transition provides an effective operational approach.Chapter 10, “Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies,” provides a framework for working with andthrough a host nation. While the U.S. may provide the primary counterinsurgent forces, it may also workindirectly through the host nation. There are also important indirect enablers.Chapter 11, “Working with Host-Nation Forces,” provides a foundation for understanding how securitycooperation efforts are integrated into a counterinsurgency effort. Whether U.S. forces are, for a time, theprimary counterinsurgent forces or they are working indirectly through a host nation, enabling the hostnation through security cooperation activities is essential.Chapter 12, “Assessments,” provides doctrine for understanding how a counterinsurgency environmentchanges and determining if counterinsurgent actions are having an effect on achieving the desired end state.Continued assessments are fundamental to understanding how an environment is evolving and reframingthe basic problems commanders and staffs are facing.Chapter 13, “Legal Considerations” provides some legal considerations that are important for commandersand staffs to consider in all counterinsurgency operations.FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 provides doctrine on how to understand a counterinsurgency environment,determine the counterinsurgency problem, and plan and execute operations in that environment. It providesguidance to commanders and staffs facing the unique challenges of countering an insurgency. This fieldmanual is one manual in a larger doctrinal library that commanders and staffs need to understand in orderto be effective in countering an insurgency. Any effort to counter an insurgency must be built on broadprofessional competence.The Army uses the term intelligence preparation of the battlefield while the Marine Corps uses the termintelligence preparation of the battlespace. Both Services use the same definition for these terms. Thismanual uses the term intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace to align withFM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A.viiiFM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.513 May 2014

PART ONEStrategic and Operational ContextWhen the United States (U.S.) conducts or supports counterinsurgency operations, itdoes so in a unique strategic and operational environment. While this is true for alloperations, this is of particular importance when the U.S. is countering aninsurgency. Tactical actions often have strategic effects in a counterinsurgency. Thismakes it essential to understand both the strategic and operational context whencountering an insurgency. In this manual, part one provides an overview forcommanders and staff to understand the environment and context of an insurgencyand the decision to counter that insurgency. Chapter 1 provides the strategic contextof a counterinsurgency. When the U.S. becomes involved in a counterinsurgency,policy and strategic decisions affect operations. Chapter 2 provides an overview ofan operational environment and operational variables. In a counterinsurgency, thereare unique considerations that operators and planners consider. Of particularimportance in a counterinsurgency is culture. Chapter 3 provides an in-depthoverview of culture and its relationship to counterinsurgency.Chapter 1Understanding the Strategic Context1-1. Any decision by the President to commit United States (U.S.) forces must be understood within thelarger sphere of U.S. policy. Soldiers and Marines must first understand the strategic context that the U.S.is acting in to best plan, prepare, conduct, and assess a counterinsurgency operation to protect nationalinterests. Countering an insurgency should incorporate previous or continuing security cooperation effortsand other activities, U.S. and host-nation objectives, and U.S. and host-nation whole-of-government effortsto address the root causes of the conflict. (For more information on root causes, see paragraphs 4-14through 4-22.) Despite its irregular nature and generally less intense level of combat, counterinsurgencymay be just as critical to U.S. vital interests as conventional warfare.1-2. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influenceover the relevant population(s) (JP 1). Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employthe full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.Because of its irregular nature, U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgency demands a whole-of-governmentapproach. Defeating an insurgency requires a blend of both civilian and military efforts that address bothassisting the host-nation government in defeating the insurgents on the battlefield and enabling the hostnation in addressing the root causes of the insurgency. Moreover, after large scale combat or in anungoverned space, there may not be a functioning host-nation government. In those cases, U.S. forces mustwork with population groups in the area and enable them to build governmental capacity. In either case,U.S. civilian and military participants in counterinsurgency cannot compensate for lack of will, acceptanceof corruption, or counterproductive behavior on the part of the supported government or the population.1-3. Insurgency in the most basic form is a struggle for control and influence, generally from a position ofrelative weakness, outside existing state institutions. Insurgencies can exist apart from or before, during, orafter a conventional conflict. Elements of a population often grow dissatisfied with the status quo. When a13 May 2014FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.51-1

Chapter 1population or groups in a population are willing to fight to change the conditions to their favor, using bothviolent and nonviolent means to affect a change in the prevailing authority, they often initiate aninsurgency. An insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challengepolitical control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself (JP 3-24). Counterinsurgency iscomprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency andaddress its root causes (JP 3-24). Warfare remains a clash of interests and will between organized groupscharacterized by the use of force. In conventional warfare, there are clear determinants of victory.However, achieving victory for an insurgent may depend less on defeating an armed opponent and more ona group’s ability to garner support for its political interests (often ideologically based) and to generateenough violence to achieve political consequences.1-4. Counterinsurgency is not a substitute for strategy. When counterinsurgents attempt to defeat aninsurgency, they perform a range of diverse methods intended to counter an insurgency. Commanders musteffectively arrange these diverse methods in time and space to accomplish strategic objectives. The U.S.can use a range of methods to aid a host nation or group in defeating an insurgency. The variouscombinations of these methods with different levels of resourcing provide the U.S. with a wide range ofstrategic options to defeat an insurgency. The strategy to counter an insurgency is determined by the endsthe U.S. wishes to achieve, the ways it wishes to achieve those ends, and the resources or means it uses toenable those ways. (See paragraphs 1-10 through 1-13 for more information on strategy.)1-5. There is a spectrum of involvement in countering an insurgency. The U.S. could enable a host nationby not providing forces that are directly involved in securing the population or attacking the insurgents. Forexample, the U.S. could provide training or intelligence support to a host nation. Moreover, even if the U.S.is directly involved in defeating the insurgency, its primary role can be only to enable a host nation. A hostnation may be capable of providing civil control and security. The U.S. commander can integrate a forceinto the host-nation’s efforts that provides a force to perform direct action or fires provided by airpower orfield artillery. U.S. involvement can range from a modest and supporting commi

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 applies to the United States Marine Corps, the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. The proponent of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is the United