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Art of War PapersLansdale, Magsaysay, America, and thePhilippinesA Case Study of Limited InterventionCounterinsurgencyAndrew E. Lembke, Major, US ArmyCombat Studies Institute PressUS Army Combined Arms CenterFort Leavenworth, Kansas

The cover photo courtesy of the Library of Congress is that of GeneralDwight Eisenhower giving orders to American paratroopers in England.

Lansdale, Magsaysay, America, and the PhilippinesA Case Study of Limited Intervention CounterinsurgencyAndrew E. Lembke, Major, US ArmyB.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York,2001Fort Leavenworth, Kansas2012-02

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataLembke, Andrew E.Lansdale, Magsaysay, America and the Philippines: A Case Study ofLimited Intervention Counterinsurgency / Andrew E. Lembke, Major, USArmy, B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point.ISBN 978-0-9885837-6-41. Philippines--History--1946-1986. 2. Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan(Philippines) 3. Counterinsurgency--Philippines--History--20th century.4. United States--Military relations--Philippines. 5. Philippines--Militaryrelations--United States. 6. Lansdale, Edward Geary, 1908-1987. 7.Magsaysay, Ramon, 1907-1957. I. Title.DS686.5.L37 2013959.904--dc232013 0086042013Combat Studies Institute Press publications covera wide variety of military history topics. Theviews expressed in this CSI Press publication arethose of the author(s) and not necessarily those ofthe Department of the Army or the Departmentof Defense. A full list of CSI Press publicationsavailable for downloading can be found athttp://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp.The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document asan official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s officialseal on any republication without the express written permission of theDirector of CSI.EditorCarl W. Fischerii

AbstractHistorians tend to agree that Ramon Magsaysay’s leadership and hisrelationship with Edward Lansdale are two of the most important featuresof the Philippine governments campaign against the Huks from 19461954. Yet the nuances of his leadership and the nature of their relationshipdeserve greater investigation. This thesis seeks to further illuminateMagsaysay and Lansdale’s relationship by focusing on the role of empathyand sociocultural understanding, in defeating the Huks and restoring thePhilippine government’s legitimacy. US policy in the Philippines at the time,bolstered regimes riddled with corruption, graft, and nepotism, reinforcingpoor governance, and resulting in a loss of government legitimacy. Thisenergized the Huk movement until they were on the verge of topplingthe government. A change in US policy coincided with the emergence ofMagsaysay and Lansdale. They reversed Huk momentum, rejuvenatedthe demoralized and oppressive armed forces, and restored the Philippinegovernment’s legitimacy, all in less than four years. Their shared, genuineempathy for the Filipino people fostered deep sociocultural understanding.Their combined capabilities and resources then translated empathy andsociocultural understanding into concrete measures to combat the Huksand rebuild popular support for the government.iii

AcknowledgmentsI would like to thank first and foremost my wife Lachlyn for her supportand encouragement throughout this process, despite our geographicseparation. She has, without fail, pushed me to complete my work basedon her own notable academic accomplishments. She has truly been one ofmy most important guides.The support of my thesis committee, consisting of Dr. D. ScottStephenson, Dr. Joseph Fischer, and Dr. Nicholas Murray, was absolutelyessential to the successful completion of my thesis. Their feedback andinsights have proven invaluable throughout the course of this endeavor,and without their support I have no doubt that my work would have fallenshort of the mark.During my research in the Philippines I received the utmost supportof the US Embassy team in Manila. Ambassador Harry K. Thomas and hisstaff, headed by Executive Secretary Ms. Eloisa Williard, were instrumentalin arranging a number of my interviews with Filipino notables. Within theembassy team I would also like to specifically thank Mr. Ramon Taruc forcoordinating my interview with his distant relative, Dr. Romeo Taruc.In addition to the support of the US Embassy team I would liketo acknowledge the assistance of another group that was extremelysupportive of my efforts in the Philippines. The West Point Associationof Graduates of Manila, specifically Ms. Grace Jarque and Captain MarkPosadas (Philippine Army, West Point Class of 2004), proved invaluablein facilitating my research. I would also like to acknowledge Mr. Jim Cisek(US Embassy Manila, West Point Class of 1974) for introducing me to thiswonderful community.I am eternally grateful to Dr. Daniel Marston. If it were not for hisadvocacy I would not have had this opportunity. I would also like to thankhim for his editorial advice and assistance. Other academics I would liketo acknowledge are Dr. Douglas Macdonald and Colonel (ret.) JosephFelter. Dr. Macdonald, currently a Visiting Research Professor of NationalSecurity Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, was kind enoughto review my early thesis ideas and help me focus them on the topic Ifinally settled on. Colonel (ret.) Felter, currently a Research Fellow at theHoover Institution at Stanford University, provided invaluable assistancein facilitating my research at the Hoover Institution Archives, as well asmy research in the Philippines.v

I would be remiss in not thanking the subjects of my research in thePhilippines. I am truly indebted to former President Fidel V. Ramos,former senator Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., Mr. Alfredo Lim, mayor of Manila,Dr. Romeo Taruc, Municipal Councilor of Angeles City, Pampanga, Mr.Frisco San Juan, president of the Nationalist Peoples Coalition, and FatherJack Schumacher, retired Jesuit priest, historian, and professor at AteneoUniversity, Manila. Interviews with these men not only shed light on thecharacter and personality of the subjects of my research, but also providedinvaluable context for the rest of my writing and research.I would also like the staffs of the Hoover Institution Archives, theTruman Library, and the Combined Arms Research Library. Theirprofessionalism, dedication, and inherent knowledge after decades ofservice to their organizations, made them indispensable assets during mylimited duration visits. Without their assistance I would not have been ableto achieve the breadth of research I finally achieved.Finally, I would like to acknowledge and thank my fellow Art of Warscholars, Will Harris, Lou Ruscetta, and Stephen Campbell. The intellectualrigor they subjected me to on a daily basis constantly challenged me toimprove. They were both a source of inspiration and frustration, and wereessential to the development of my argument.vi

Table of ContentsChapter 1 Introduction. 1Chapter 2 Context of a Crisis.11Chapter 3 New Beginnings. 35Chapter 4 New Threats. 67Chapter 5 Conclusion. 101Appendix A Map of Primary Huk Influence.115Appendix B Subject Biographical Timelines.117Appendix C Interviewee Biographical Data.119Bibliography. 121vii

AcronymsAFPArmed Forces of the PhilippinesAMTAguman ding Malding Talapagobra (GeneralWorkers Party)BCTBattalion Combat TeamCIACentral Intelligence AgencyCICCounterintelligence CorpsEDCOREconomic Development CorpsHMBHukbong MapagpalayaLiberation Army)JUSMAGJoint United States Military Advisory GroupKPMPKalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka saPilipinas (National Society of Peasants in thePhilippines)MPCMilitary Police CommandNAMFRELNational Movement for Free ElectionsOPCOffice of Policy CoordinationOSSOffice of Strategic ServicesPCPhilippine ConstabularyPCACPresidential Complaints and Action CommissionPHILRYCOMPhilippines Ryukus CommandPKPPartidoKomunistangCommunist Party)USAFFEUnited States Armed Forces Far EastngBayanPilipina(People’s(Philippineix

Chapter 1IntroductionThe Huk campaign was a classic example of counterinsurgency,with lessons all too often overlooked or misunderstood by thosewho face the problems of insurgency in other countries of theworld.— Major General Edward Lansdale, personal correspondencewith Lavinia Hanson (Valeriano), 5 March 1984.1American interest in counterinsurgency seems to emerge only whenconfronted by insurgency. Major General Lansdale’s comment in 1984about the lack of interest in the Huk campaign, and counterinsurgencyin general, was likely attributable to a number of factors, among themAmerica’s recent experience in Vietnam. The US military focused on theconventional Soviet threat rather than lessons from irregular conflicts.However, since 9/11 the US engaged in two conflicts that developed intocounterinsurgencies, and the Huk campaign continued to receive scantattention. Whatever the reasons for previous inattention during the lastdecade, the Huk campaign bears important lessons for US military andcivilian policy-makers.US defense and foreign policy seems to be shying away from largescale counterinsurgency operations and nation-building.2 Yet, if the USintends to defend its national interests abroad it must be prepared toconfront the possibility of engaging in future counterinsurgency campaigns.Memories of Vietnam and recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraqmay bias American understanding of counterinsurgency as inherentlylarge-scale, i.e. long, resource and manpower intensive, and generallyAmerican-led. Generalizing the characteristics of counterinsurgency inthis way ignores both the historical context of the respective situationsin Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and other examples of successful,small-scale counterinsurgency campaigns. By contrast, US assistance tothe Philippine government against the Huks, from 1946-54 provides anexcellent case study of limited, yet successful intervention.3The US and Philippine governments were ultimately successful in acounterinsurgency campaign that went poorly for the first four years. Theinitial years following World War II saw a dangerous mix of ill-informedUS policy in the Philippines and a Philippine government beset withcorruption and scandal. By 1950 a change in US policy acknowledged thegravity of the situation by tying economic and military aid to political andsocial reforms.4 Yet this top-down approach was insufficient to address1

the most immediate problem. The Filipino masses had lost faith in theirgovernment, weakening its legitimacy. Without immediate action to reversethis trend the Huk movement, which was really just a symptom of this lossof faith, stood a very real chance of toppling the government. Essentially,the US approach required a complementary bottom-up approach to tie thepeople back to their government while the longer term top-down reformstook effect.Such a complementary approach to national level reform effortshad to rebuild popular faith in and support for the government, therebyreestablishing its legitimacy. Developing the necessary bottom-upstrategy required individuals cognizant of the nuances of Philippinepolitics, and capable of understanding and identifying with the Filipinopeople. Additionally, the Americans needed a strong Filipino counterpartcapable of rallying the people just as they were nearing physical andmoral exhaustion. Amidst this need came Edward Lansdale from the USgovernment and Ramon Magsaysay from the Philippine government.Magsaysay and Lansdale’s close contact with and understanding ofthe people’s needs, their unique backgrounds, and common charactercombined to make them an extremely powerful and effective team, despitetheir relatively junior positions at the beginning of the Huk campaign. Thisthesis will argue the collaboration between Ramon Magsaysay and EdwardLansdale emerged as a critical factor in the Philippine government’ssuccessful campaign against the Huk movement, from 1946-54, becauseof their shared empathy for the Filipino people, deep socioculturalunderstanding, and complimentary capabilities and resources. Whilethis may suggest that it is impossible to duplicate the success of the Hukcampaign because of the unique characters involved, it may be possibleto replicate the factors of success by finding leaders with the attributesdemonstrated by Lansdale and Magsaysay.The Role of EmpathyThis paper will argue that genuine empathy for the Filipino masses wasa key feature of the Lansdale-Magsaysay dynamic. In order to analyze andassess the implications of empathy within the context of this case study,and because this is not a paper on leadership theory, a working definitionof empathy is required. Dr. Jaepil Choi, in his paper on charismaticleadership, identified the characteristic of empathy as:the ability to understand another person’s motives, values,and emotions . . . and it involves entering the other person’sperspectives . . . sensitivity to followers’ needs . . . individualized2

attention to followers . . . encourag[ing] personal development . . .[and] displaying support for the efforts of followers.5For the purpose of this paper, empathy is “the ability to experience andrelate to the thoughts, emotions, or experience of others.”6 Using thisdefinition and the characteristics of empathy described above, it is clearthat this trait is intensely personal; requiring a significant degree ofunderstanding of and contact with subordinates, or in this case

Art of War Papers. Lansdale, Magsaysay, America, and the Philippines. A Case Study of Limited Intervention Counterinsurgency. Andrew E. Lembke, Major, US Army. Combat Studies Institute Press US Army Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The cover photo courtesy of the Library of Congress is that of General . Dwight Eisenhower giving orders to American paratroopers in England.